facets-module-mcp
PyPI
v0.1.21
Published by facets-cloud — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Facets Module MCP
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`facets_mcp/utils/ftf_command_utils.py:56`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: config result = subprocess.run( ["git", "config", "--get", "remote.origin.url"], cwd=wor
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server facets_mcp/utils/ftf_command_utils.py
Tool "edit_file_block" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "edit_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool edit_file_block
Tool "edit_file_block" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool edit_file_block
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
edit_file_blockwrites filesget_deployment_logsreads sensitive dataget_local_modulesingests untrusted inputlist_filesreads sensitive dataread_filereads sensitive dataadd_import_declarationno sensitive capabilitycheck_deployment_statusno sensitive capabilitycreate_or_update_intentno sensitive capabilitydiscover_terraform_resourcesno sensitive capabilityfind_output_types_with_providerno sensitive capabilityFIRST_STEP_get_instructionsno sensitive capabilityfork_existing_moduleno sensitive capabilitygenerate_module_with_user_confirmationno sensitive capabilityget_intentno sensitive capabilityget_output_type_detailsno sensitive capabilitylist_all_intentsno sensitive capabilitylist_all_output_typesno sensitive capabilitylist_modules_for_forkno sensitive capabilitylist_test_projectsno sensitive capabilitymark_module_as_publishedno sensitive capabilitypush_preview_module_to_facets_cpno sensitive capabilityregister_output_typeno sensitive capabilitysearch_modules_after_confirmationno sensitive capabilitytest_already_previewed_moduleno sensitive capabilityvalidate_moduleno sensitive capabilitywrite_config_filesno sensitive capabilitywrite_generic_fileno sensitive capabilitywrite_outputsno sensitive capabilitywrite_readme_fileno sensitive capabilitywrite_resource_fileno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.21 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan facets-module-mcp --online --registry pypi
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