Fabric Dw MCP Server
fabric-dw
PyPI
v2026.8.0
Published by sdebruyn — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Python CLI and MCP server for Microsoft Fabric Data Warehouses and SQL Analytics Endpoints: administer, query, optimize, and secure them from your terminal or your AI agent
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/fabric_dw/cli/_plan_svg.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/fabric_dw/cli/_plan_svg.py:61`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 [_DOT_BINARY, "-Tsvg"], input=dot_text.enc
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/fabric_dw/cli/_plan_svg.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/fabric_dw/services/dbt_scaffold.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/fabric_dw/services/dbt_scaffold.py:581`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: dProcessError): subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 [git_path, "init", str(folder)], check=Tru
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/fabric_dw/services/dbt_scaffold.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/integration/test_cli_smoke.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/integration/test_cli_smoke.py:218`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: l_env) try: subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 [_FABRIC_DW_BIN, "sql", "exec", "-q", "SELECT 1 AS n"]
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/integration/test_cli_smoke.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/integration/test_journey_config_defaults.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/integration/test_journey_config_defaults.py:93`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 [_JOURNEY_BIN, *args], capture_output=True
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/integration/test_journey_config_defaults.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/unit/cli/test_plan_svg.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/unit/cli/test_plan_svg.py:174`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: th ['dot', '-Tsvg'] (no shell=True).""" operators = parse_showplan(_FIXTURE_XML) with ( patc
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/unit/cli/test_plan_svg.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/unit/test_import_hygiene.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/unit/test_import_hygiene.py:84`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: H", None) result = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 [sys.executable, "-c", snippet + _REPORT], capture
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/unit/test_import_hygiene.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/unit/test_shutdown_clean.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/unit/test_shutdown_clean.py:98`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e. """ result = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 [*_CLI_RUNNER, "config", "show", "--json"], captur
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/unit/test_shutdown_clean.py
Tools 60
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
execute_sqlreads sensitive dataget_audit_settingsingests untrusted inputget_functioningests untrusted inputget_procedureingests untrusted inputget_viewingests untrusted inputlist_capabilitiesreads sensitive dataadd_audit_groupno sensitive capabilityclear_cacheno sensitive capabilitycount_table_rowsno sensitive capabilitycount_view_rowsno sensitive capability
Show 50 more tools ↓
disable_auditno sensitive capabilityenable_auditno sensitive capabilitygenerate_dbt_profileno sensitive capabilityget_cluster_columnsno sensitive capabilityget_query_planno sensitive capabilityget_request_detailno sensitive capabilityget_restore_pointno sensitive capabilityget_sql_endpointno sensitive capabilityget_sql_poolno sensitive capabilityget_sql_pools_statusno sensitive capabilityget_table_columnsno sensitive capabilityget_table_health_metricsno sensitive capabilityget_view_columnsno sensitive capabilityget_warehouseno sensitive capabilityget_warehouse_settingsno sensitive capabilityget_workspaceno sensitive capabilitykill_sessionno sensitive capabilitylist_capacitiesno sensitive capabilitylist_connectionsno sensitive capabilitylist_database_principalsno sensitive capabilitylist_frequent_queriesno sensitive capabilitylist_functionsno sensitive capabilitylist_item_permissionsno sensitive capabilitylist_locksno sensitive capabilitylist_long_running_queriesno sensitive capabilitylist_masked_columnsno sensitive capabilitylist_proceduresno sensitive capabilitylist_request_historyno sensitive capabilitylist_restore_pointsno sensitive capabilitylist_running_queriesno sensitive capabilitylist_schemasno sensitive capabilitylist_security_policiesno sensitive capabilitylist_session_historyno sensitive capabilitylist_snapshotsno sensitive capabilitylist_sql_endpointsno sensitive capabilitylist_sql_permissionsno sensitive capabilitylist_sql_pool_insightsno sensitive capabilitylist_sql_poolsno sensitive capabilitylist_statisticsno sensitive capabilitylist_tablesno sensitive capabilitylist_viewsno sensitive capabilitylist_warehousesno sensitive capabilitylist_workspacesno sensitive capabilitymy_permissionsno sensitive capabilityread_tableno sensitive capabilityread_viewno sensitive capabilityremove_audit_groupno sensitive capabilityset_audit_action_groupsno sensitive capabilityset_audit_retentionno sensitive capabilityshow_statisticsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (60 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2026.8.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
v2026.7.3 |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan fabric-dw --online --registry pypiMore in Cloud & DevOps
Operator control CLI for AdGuard Home with an MCP adapter
interacting with Aliyun (Alibaba Cloud) services through This MCP server provides tools.
MCP server for the Aspro.Cloud REST API
MCP server for Atlassian Confluence and Jira Cloud APIs
AuroraCloud-first MCP server that exposes AuroraDocs workspace data to Claude Desktop and other AI agents
The official AWS Knowledge Base retrieval server using Bedrock Agent Runtime.