Zoom (expertintegrado) MCP Server
@expertintegrado/zoom-mcp
npm
v1.3.2
Published by @expertintegrado — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Servidor MCP oficial da Expert Integrado para Zoom Team Chat.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (auth.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`auth.js:63`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t tokenResponse = await fetch("https://zoom.us/oauth/token", { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-T
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server auth.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/zoom-request.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`src/zoom-request.js:32`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch("https://zoom.us/oauth/token", { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Type":
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/zoom-request.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 4
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.3.2 latest |
A 96/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.3.1 |
A 96/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-13 |
v1.2.0 |
A 96/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-06 |
v1.1.0 |
A 96/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-03 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @expertintegrado/zoom-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Zoom 6
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 7 side by side →
Now you can date a ZOOM meeting with AI's help.
Now you can date a ZOOM meeting with AI's help.
MCP server for Zoom - access meeting transcripts and AI summaries from Claude
Zoom MCP Pack
MCP server for Zoom API — meetings, transcripts, users, and team chat
Zoom meetings mcp server.
More in Marketing & Social
Official Abyssfall game info, newsletter double opt-in, and merch reservation tools.
AdCritter ads platform: docs, API reference, app scaffolding, and white-label integration.
Google AdSense MCP Server - Monitor earnings, reports, and account health via Claude/AI
Operational empathy for technical founders + PE/VC operators navigating high-stakes B2B interactions. 28 MCP tools + CLI: ICP scoring, persona simulation, battlecards, deal classification, prospect discovery, investor matching, founder wellness, plus mark
MCP server for Bing Webmaster Tools — SEO site management, URL submission, sitemaps, stats, keywords
MCP (Model Context Protocol) server that helps AI agents use Primer Brand (@primer/react-brand) correctly when building GitHub marketing and landing pages.