Expandfi MCP Server
@expandfi/mcp-server
npm
v1.6.1
Published by @expandfi — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
ExpandFi MCP server for Claude Desktop and Claude Code
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
high Shell/command execution in server code (expandfi_mcp_base.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`expandfi_mcp_base.js:525`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } = await import("node:child_process"); const { file, args } = browserOpenCommand(process.platform, url); // No `sh
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server expandfi_mcp_base.js
Tools 32
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
download_data_dash_artifactingests untrusted inputdownload_reportingests untrusted inputget_skillsingests untrusted inputget_support_requestingests untrusted inputlist_support_request_attachmentsingests untrusted inputcancel_data_dashno sensitive capabilitycogs_coverage_gapsno sensitive capabilitycreate_data_dashno sensitive capabilitydataset_contextno sensitive capabilityget_auth_statusno sensitive capability
Show 22 more tools ↓
get_docsno sensitive capabilityget_docs_versionno sensitive capabilityget_skills_versionno sensitive capabilitylist_cogsno sensitive capabilitylist_data_dashesno sensitive capabilitylist_datasetsno sensitive capabilitylist_merchantsno sensitive capabilitylist_reportsno sensitive capabilitylist_support_requestsno sensitive capabilitylist_tablesno sensitive capabilitymerchant_health_summaryno sensitive capabilitypreview_cogs_planno sensitive capabilityreadonly_db_connectionno sensitive capabilityreport_contextno sensitive capabilityreport_datano sensitive capabilityreport_routing_guidanceno sensitive capabilityreport_summaryno sensitive capabilityshow_data_dashno sensitive capabilityshow_merchantno sensitive capabilitysubmit_feedbackno sensitive capabilitytable_contextno sensitive capabilityupdate_support_requestno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (32 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.6.1 latest |
A 92/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.5.0 |
B 82/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v1.4.0 |
B 82/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-22 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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