Exfer MCP Server
exfer-mcp
PyPI
v0.7.1
Published by exfer-stack — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/exfer_mcp/walletd_supervisor.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/exfer_mcp/walletd_supervisor.py:485`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.Popen( [binary, "--datadir", str(cfg.datadir), "init-seeded"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/exfer_mcp/walletd_supervisor.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_lazy_managed.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_lazy_managed.py:141`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ing-up with a SLOW stub spawn (the ready event is never set within the test) and confirm list_tools still return
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_lazy_managed.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_supervisor.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_supervisor.py:201`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: for walletd. proc = subprocess.Popen(["sleep", "30"]) sup._proc = proc sup.stop() assert proc.poll() is
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_supervisor.py
Tools 40
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
exfer_bsc_get_addressno sensitive capabilityexfer_bsc_get_balanceno sensitive capabilityexfer_check_updateno sensitive capabilityexfer_earnno sensitive capabilityexfer_earn_pool_statsno sensitive capabilityexfer_earn_probeno sensitive capabilityexfer_earn_statusno sensitive capabilityexfer_earn_stopno sensitive capabilityexfer_find_settlements_by_quote_idno sensitive capabilityexfer_generate_addressno sensitive capability
Show 30 more tools ↓
exfer_get_address_historyno sensitive capabilityexfer_get_balanceno sensitive capabilityexfer_get_blockno sensitive capabilityexfer_get_block_heightno sensitive capabilityexfer_get_output_datumno sensitive capabilityexfer_get_transactionno sensitive capabilityexfer_htlc_claimno sensitive capabilityexfer_htlc_listno sensitive capabilityexfer_htlc_lockno sensitive capabilityexfer_htlc_reclaimno sensitive capabilityexfer_htlc_statusno sensitive capabilityexfer_list_addressesno sensitive capabilityexfer_network_hashrateno sensitive capabilityexfer_network_statusno sensitive capabilityexfer_payment_uri_decodeno sensitive capabilityexfer_payment_uri_encodeno sensitive capabilityexfer_quote_issueno sensitive capabilityexfer_quote_verifyno sensitive capabilityexfer_sign_messageno sensitive capabilityexfer_simulate_transferno sensitive capabilityexfer_swap_executeno sensitive capabilityexfer_swap_get_quoteno sensitive capabilityexfer_swap_listno sensitive capabilityexfer_swap_pool_infono sensitive capabilityexfer_swap_refundno sensitive capabilityexfer_swap_statusno sensitive capabilityexfer_transferno sensitive capabilityexfer_verify_messageno sensitive capabilityexfer_wait_for_paymentno sensitive capabilityexfer_wait_for_txno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (40 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.7.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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