Execbro — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "execbro",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "execbro"
},
"server": {
"name": "execbro"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 92,
"threatScore": 98,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 2.1,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 0.6
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 0.25,
"appliedPenalty": 0.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (2 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/core/exec.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/core/exec.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/core/exec.js"
},
"evidence": ", execFile } from \"node:child_process\"; export function execFileAsync(file, args, opts = {}) { const { signal, ...ex",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/core/exec.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/core/fingerprint.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/core/fingerprint.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/core/fingerprint.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFileSync } from \"child_process\"; import { readFileSync, existsSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from \"fs\"; import",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/core/fingerprint.js",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/core/ocr.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/core/ocr.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/core/ocr.js"
},
"evidence": "import { spawn } from \"child_process\"; import { getInstallationId } from \"./telemetry.js\"; const OCR_ENDPOINT = \"https:",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/core/ocr.js",
"line": 7,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (build/__tests__/unit/networkInterceptorXhr.test.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`build/__tests__/unit/networkInterceptorXhr.test.js:307`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/__tests__/unit/networkInterceptorXhr.test.js"
},
"evidence": "lFetch; sandbox.fetch(\"https://api.example.com/dual\"); expect(events().filter((e) => e.type === \"request",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "build/__tests__/unit/networkInterceptorXhr.test.js",
"line": 307,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"title": "Hardcoded JSON Web Token in test/example/packaging (build/__tests__/unit/httpRequest.test.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "A hardcoded JSON Web Token (an embedded JSON Web Token (often an example or expired token)) appears in `build/__tests__/unit/httpRequest.test.js:6`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.",
"remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/__tests__/unit/httpRequest.test.js"
},
"evidence": "JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "jwt",
"file": "build/__tests__/unit/httpRequest.test.js",
"line": 6
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"title": "Hardcoded JSON Web Token in test/example/packaging (build/__tests__/unit/vault.test.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "A hardcoded JSON Web Token (an embedded JSON Web Token (often an example or expired token)) appears in `build/__tests__/unit/vault.test.js:2`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.",
"remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/__tests__/unit/vault.test.js"
},
"evidence": "JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "jwt",
"file": "build/__tests__/unit/vault.test.js",
"line": 2
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"title": "Hardcoded JSON Web Token in test/example/packaging (build/__tests__/unit/vaultSlots.test.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "A hardcoded JSON Web Token (an embedded JSON Web Token (often an example or expired token)) appears in `build/__tests__/unit/vaultSlots.test.js:3`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.",
"remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/__tests__/unit/vaultSlots.test.js"
},
"evidence": "JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "jwt",
"file": "build/__tests__/unit/vaultSlots.test.js",
"line": 3
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (build/__tests__/helpers/mock-harness.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`build/__tests__/helpers/mock-harness.js:61`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/__tests__/helpers/mock-harness.js"
},
"evidence": "teContext(sandbox); vm.runInContext(getInterceptorScript(), sandbox); vm.runInContext(buildMockPushScript(JSON.s",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "build/__tests__/helpers/mock-harness.js",
"line": 61,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (build/__tests__/unit/appContext.test.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`build/__tests__/unit/appContext.test.js:6`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/__tests__/unit/appContext.test.js"
},
"evidence": ") { const run = new Function(\"globalThis\", source + \"; return (\" + expr + \");\"); return run(globalStub);",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "build/__tests__/unit/appContext.test.js",
"line": 6,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (build/__tests__/unit/appRequest.test.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`build/__tests__/unit/appRequest.test.js:40`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/__tests__/unit/appRequest.test.js"
},
"evidence": "); expect(() => new Function(\"return \" + src.replace(/^\\(function/, \"(function\"))).not.toThrow(); }); it",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "build/__tests__/unit/appRequest.test.js",
"line": 40,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (build/__tests__/unit/inputTarget.test.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`build/__tests__/unit/inputTarget.test.js:158`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/__tests__/unit/inputTarget.test.js"
},
"evidence": "}; return eval(expr); }; it(\"still reports the wrapper as the field's name\", () => { const",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "build/__tests__/unit/inputTarget.test.js",
"line": 158,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (build/__tests__/unit/measureComponentResolution.test.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`build/__tests__/unit/measureComponentResolution.test.js:53`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/__tests__/unit/measureComponentResolution.test.js"
},
"evidence": "dex); return (await new Function(`return (${expr});`)()); } afterEach(() => { const g = globalThis; delete g",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "build/__tests__/unit/measureComponentResolution.test.js",
"line": 53,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (build/__tests__/unit/moduleRegistry.test.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`build/__tests__/unit/moduleRegistry.test.js:27`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/__tests__/unit/moduleRegistry.test.js"
},
"evidence": "}; const run = new Function(\"globalThis\", source + \"; return __eb_require;\"); const req = run(globalThi",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "build/__tests__/unit/moduleRegistry.test.js",
"line": 27,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (build/__tests__/unit/navigation.test.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`build/__tests__/unit/navigation.test.js:6`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/__tests__/unit/navigation.test.js"
},
"evidence": ") { const run = new Function(\"globalThis\", source + \"; return __eb_nav;\"); return run(globalStub); }",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "build/__tests__/unit/navigation.test.js",
"line": 6,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (build/__tests__/unit/networkInterceptorXhr.test.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`build/__tests__/unit/networkInterceptorXhr.test.js:59`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/__tests__/unit/networkInterceptorXhr.test.js"
},
"evidence": "teContext(sandbox); vm.runInContext(getInterceptorScript(), sandbox); return { sandbox: sandbox,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "build/__tests__/unit/networkInterceptorXhr.test.js",
"line": 59,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (build/__tests__/unit/pressablesLongPress.test.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`build/__tests__/unit/pressablesLongPress.test.js:44`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/__tests__/unit/pressablesLongPress.test.js"
},
"evidence": "d) { const fn = new Function(\"globalThis\", `return (${expression.trim()});`); last = fn(globalThisStub);",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "build/__tests__/unit/pressablesLongPress.test.js",
"line": 44,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (build/__tests__/unit/pressablesSwitch.test.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`build/__tests__/unit/pressablesSwitch.test.js:44`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/__tests__/unit/pressablesSwitch.test.js"
},
"evidence": "d) { const fn = new Function(\"globalThis\", `return (${expression.trim()});`); last = fn(globalThisStub);",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "build/__tests__/unit/pressablesSwitch.test.js",
"line": 44,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (build/__tests__/unit/componentFormatNaming.test.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`build/__tests__/unit/componentFormatNaming.test.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/__tests__/unit/componentFormatNaming.test.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; describe(\"component formatter naming\", () => { it(\"no production source, doc",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/__tests__/unit/componentFormatNaming.test.js",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (build/__tests__/unit/fingerprint.test.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`build/__tests__/unit/fingerprint.test.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/__tests__/unit/fingerprint.test.js"
},
"evidence": "ss = await import(\"node:child_process\"); const realFs = await import(\"node:fs\"); const realOs = await import(\"node:os\");",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/__tests__/unit/fingerprint.test.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (build/__tests__/unit/keyboardMetrics.test.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`build/__tests__/unit/keyboardMetrics.test.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/__tests__/unit/keyboardMetrics.test.js"
},
"evidence": "eyboardState(undefined, exec({ visible: true, metrics: { height: 345, screenY: 567, width: 420 } })); expect(s).",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/__tests__/unit/keyboardMetrics.test.js",
"line": 9,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "ios_button",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dev",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "c8a23f571ed676bb85aa807b704c1f81262cdf3aadc385812bc02b8c56fda017",
"stats": {
"tools": 2,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 3,
"medium": 0,
"low": 17,
"info": 0
}
}
}