Exchange MCP Server

exchange-mcp-server PyPI v1.0.1

Published by nhype — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

MCP server for Exchange / OWA - email, calendar, directory, availability

Trust grade
A
96/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 96/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Moderate
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 96/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−3 capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([download_event_attachments, download_attachments]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_email, forward_email]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [download_event_attachments, download_attachments] → sinks [send_email, forward_email]

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow download_event_attachments → send_email

Tools 30

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • download_attachmentsingests untrusted input
  • download_event_attachmentsingests untrusted input
  • forward_emailnetwork egress
  • send_emailnetwork egress
  • cancel_meetingno sensitive capability
  • check_sessionno sensitive capability
  • create_folderno sensitive capability
  • create_meetingno sensitive capability
  • delete_emailno sensitive capability
  • delete_folderno sensitive capability
Show 20 more tools ↓
  • empty_folderno sensitive capability
  • find_free_timeno sensitive capability
  • find_meeting_timeno sensitive capability
  • find_personno sensitive capability
  • get_calendar_eventsno sensitive capability
  • get_emailno sensitive capability
  • get_email_linksno sensitive capability
  • get_emailsno sensitive capability
  • get_event_linksno sensitive capability
  • get_foldersno sensitive capability
  • get_meeting_contactsno sensitive capability
  • get_meeting_statsno sensitive capability
  • loginno sensitive capability
  • mark_email_readno sensitive capability
  • move_emailno sensitive capability
  • move_folderno sensitive capability
  • rename_folderno sensitive capability
  • reply_emailno sensitive capability
  • respond_to_meetingno sensitive capability
  • update_meetingno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.0.1 latest A 96/100 1 1.13.0 2026-08-25

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 96/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan exchange-mcp-server --online --registry pypi

Use the free API → How scoring works

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