Workrail MCP Server
@exaudeus/workrail
npm
v3.121.0
Source verified
Published by etiennebbeaulac — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 6 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 11
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli-worktrain.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli-worktrain.js:46`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t(require("os")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const util_1 = require("util"); const crypto_1 = req
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli-worktrain.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/context-assembly/infra.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/context-assembly/infra.js:40`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: de:crypto"); const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process"); const node_util_1 = require("node:util"); const
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/context-assembly/infra.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/daemon/runner/pre-agent-session.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/daemon/runner/pre-agent-session.js:39`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ode:path")); const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process"); const node_util_1 = require("node:util"); const
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/daemon/runner/pre-agent-session.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/daemon/startup-recovery.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/daemon/startup-recovery.js:44`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ode:path")); const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process"); const node_util_1 = require("node:util"); const
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/daemon/startup-recovery.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/daemon/tools/bash.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/daemon/tools/bash.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: akeBashTool; const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process"); const node_util_1 = require("node:util"); const
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/daemon/tools/bash.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/daemon/tools/glob-grep.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/daemon/tools/glob-grep.js:40`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ode:path")); const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process"); const node_util_1 = require("node:util"); const
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/daemon/tools/glob-grep.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/infrastructure/session/SessionManager.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/infrastructure/session/SessionManager.js:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: equire("crypto"); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const os_1 = __importDefault(require("os")); const e
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/infrastructure/session/SessionManager.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/infrastructure/storage/git-workflow-storage.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/infrastructure/storage/git-workflow-storage.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: types/workflow"); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const util_1 = require("util"); const path_1 = __imp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/infrastructure/storage/git-workflow-storage.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mcp/git-metrics/reader.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/git-metrics/reader.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ChurnSignal; const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process"); const node_util_1 = require("node:util"); const
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp/git-metrics/reader.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mcp/handlers/session.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/handlers/session.js:46`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: r(require("os")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const http_1 = require("http"); const types_js_1 = r
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp/handlers/session.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (preinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@exaudeus/workrail" executes preinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node -e "const v=parseInt(process.versions.node.split('.')[0],10); if(v<20){console.error('WorkRail requires Node.js >=20. Current: '+process.versions.node+'\nP
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @exaudeus/workrail
Tools 1
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
WorkRail Tag Catalogno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (1 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.121.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 11 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
v3.120.0 |
A 93/100 | 11 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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