Evalview — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.5.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.5.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
},
"target": {
"id": "evalview",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "evalview"
},
"server": {
"name": "evalview"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 98,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 2.1,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 2.1
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": false,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (evalview/skills/security_scanner.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`evalview/skills/security_scanner.py:7`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "evalview/skills/security_scanner.py"
},
"evidence": "~/.ssh",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "evalview/skills/security_scanner.py",
"line": 7
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (tests/skills/test_security.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`tests/skills/test_security.py:184`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/skills/test_security.py"
},
"evidence": "id_rsa",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "tests/skills/test_security.py",
"line": 184
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (demo-tests/procrastination-buster/runner.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`demo-tests/procrastination-buster/runner.py:50`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "demo-tests/procrastination-buster/runner.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.Popen(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "demo-tests/procrastination-buster/runner.py",
"line": 50
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dogfood/agent.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dogfood/agent.py:74`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dogfood/agent.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dogfood/agent.py",
"line": 74
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (evalview/adapters/aider_adapter.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`evalview/adapters/aider_adapter.py:131`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "evalview/adapters/aider_adapter.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "evalview/adapters/aider_adapter.py",
"line": 131
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (evalview/adapters/goose_adapter.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`evalview/adapters/goose_adapter.py:132`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "evalview/adapters/goose_adapter.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "evalview/adapters/goose_adapter.py",
"line": 132
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (evalview/adapters/openclaw_adapter.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`evalview/adapters/openclaw_adapter.py:125`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "evalview/adapters/openclaw_adapter.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "evalview/adapters/openclaw_adapter.py",
"line": 125
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (evalview/adapters/opencode_adapter.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`evalview/adapters/opencode_adapter.py:133`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "evalview/adapters/opencode_adapter.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "evalview/adapters/opencode_adapter.py",
"line": 133
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (evalview/chat.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`evalview/chat.py:479`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "evalview/chat.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "evalview/chat.py",
"line": 479
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (evalview/chat_commands.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`evalview/chat_commands.py:783`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "evalview/chat_commands.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "evalview/chat_commands.py",
"line": 783
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (evalview/chat_runtime.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`evalview/chat_runtime.py:37`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "evalview/chat_runtime.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "evalview/chat_runtime.py",
"line": 37
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (evalview/ci/comment.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`evalview/ci/comment.py:173`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "evalview/ci/comment.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "evalview/ci/comment.py",
"line": 173
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package has no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"evalview\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "evalview"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [],
"surfaceDigest": "48476a04bb981b9ce95cdf808ce1afc190248bf85bb5ed44f15177c245f23515",
"stats": {
"tools": 0,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 12,
"medium": 0,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}