Erliban Ssh MCP Server

@erliban/ssh-mcp-server npm v0.8.1

Published by @erliban — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

SSH MCP Server - 安全的远程服务器管理工具，支持 SSH 连接、命令执行、SFTP 文件传输

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Trust grade

89/100

Last scanned 2026-09-07 get badge →

Trust

B · 89/100

Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.

Capability

Critical

Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.

Coverage

Source

How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.

B Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 89/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 11 = 89. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

Points	Adoption-risk factor
−10	capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1	publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 23

critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002

This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: sftp_download → get_logs → exec. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.

Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.

Location: flow sftp_download → get_logs → exec

high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-006

In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:147`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: 私钥内容或私钥文件路径（如 /path/to/id_rsa）。password 或 privateKey 至少提供一个' }, passphrase: { type: 'string', d

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/index.js

high Tool "exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool exec

high Tool "exec_sudo" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "exec_sudo" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool exec_sudo

high Tool "exec_batch" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "exec_batch" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool exec_batch

high Tool "exec_shell" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "exec_shell" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool exec_shell

high Tool "shell_send" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "shell_send" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool shell_send

high Tool "shell_read" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "shell_read" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool shell_read

high Tool "shell_close" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "shell_close" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool shell_close

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/command-executor.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/core/command-executor.js:22`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: 行远程命令 */ async exec(command, host, port, username, options = {}) { // 支持自动重连 const client = awa

Location: server dist/core/command-executor.js

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/exec.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/exec.js:253`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: 执行命令 */ async exec(params) { // 目标校验（切换确认优先于危险命令确认） if (this.targetGuard) { const

Location: server dist/tools/exec.js

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "host" on "sftp_download"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "sftp_download" takes a URL/host parameter "host" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool sftp_download · inputSchema.properties.host

medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "exec"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "exec" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool exec · inputSchema.properties.command

medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "exec_sudo"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "exec_sudo" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool exec_sudo · inputSchema.properties.command

medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "exec_batch"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "exec_batch" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool exec_batch · inputSchema.properties.command

medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "exec_shell"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "exec_shell" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool exec_shell · inputSchema.properties.command

low Mutating tool "exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.