Epanet MCP Server
epanet-mcp-server
PyPI
v0.1.2
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server for EPANET water distribution network simulation via ePyT
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 2 = 98. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/epanet_mcp/tools/inspection.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/epanet_mcp/tools/inspection.py:98`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: """ sess = registry.require(network_id) d = sess.d return _network_summary(d) def get_nodes(network_id: st
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/epanet_mcp/tools/inspection.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/epanet_mcp/tools/modification.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/epanet_mcp/tools/modification.py:31`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: """ sess = registry.require(network_id) sess.d.saveInputFile(output_path) return {"saved": True, "output_pat
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/epanet_mcp/tools/modification.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/epanet_mcp/tools/scenarios.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/epanet_mcp/tools/scenarios.py:38`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: """ src = registry.require(source_id) tmp = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(suffix=".inp", delete=False) tmp.cl
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/epanet_mcp/tools/scenarios.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/epanet_mcp/tools/simulation.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/epanet_mcp/tools/simulation.py:44`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: """ sess = registry.require(network_id) d = sess.d with _simulation_cwd(): ts = d.getComputedHydrau
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/epanet_mcp/tools/simulation.py
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_modification.py)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_modification.py:13`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 1): sess = registry.require(net1) idx = sess.d.getLinkIndex("10") old_d = sess.d.getLinkDiameter(idx) re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_modification.py
Tools 44
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
add_controlno sensitive capabilityadd_patternno sensitive capabilitycreate_contamination_eventno sensitive capabilitycreate_demand_perturbationno sensitive capabilitycreate_leakage_eventno sensitive capabilitycreate_multi_failure_scenariono sensitive capabilitycreate_pressure_change_scenariono sensitive capabilitycreate_pump_control_scenariono sensitive capabilitycreate_valve_control_scenariono sensitive capabilitydelete_controlno sensitive capability
Show 34 more tools ↓
get_controlsno sensitive capabilityget_curvesno sensitive capabilityget_flow_at_timeno sensitive capabilityget_linksno sensitive capabilityget_network_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_nodesno sensitive capabilityget_optionsno sensitive capabilityget_patternsno sensitive capabilityget_pressure_at_timeno sensitive capabilitylist_bundled_networksno sensitive capabilitylist_networksno sensitive capabilityload_networkno sensitive capabilityrun_full_simulationno sensitive capabilityrun_hydraulic_simulationno sensitive capabilityrun_quality_simulationno sensitive capabilitysave_networkno sensitive capabilityset_hydraulic_timestepno sensitive capabilityset_node_base_demandno sensitive capabilityset_patternno sensitive capabilityset_pipe_diameterno sensitive capabilityset_pipe_lengthno sensitive capabilityset_pipe_roughnessno sensitive capabilityset_pipe_statusno sensitive capabilityset_pump_head_curveno sensitive capabilityset_pump_speedno sensitive capabilityset_pump_statusno sensitive capabilityset_quality_timestepno sensitive capabilityset_quality_typeno sensitive capabilityset_reservoir_headno sensitive capabilityset_simulation_durationno sensitive capabilityset_tank_parametersno sensitive capabilityset_valve_settingno sensitive capabilityset_valve_statusno sensitive capabilityunload_networkno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (44 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.2 latest |
A 98/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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