VHGENGINE MCP Server
https://engine-production-3bdc.up.railway.app/mcp
Remote
v3.2.0
Published by engine-production-3bdc.up.railway.app — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Agents-first viral-hook engine: generate, score, and remix short-form hooks over MCP.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: get_hook → list_keys → delete_webhook. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow get_hook → list_keys → delete_webhook
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "set_webhook"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "set_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool set_webhook · inputSchema.properties.url
Tools 45
Each tool and what it can reach — enumerated from the running server.
delete_webhooknetwork egressget_hookingests untrusted inputlist_keysreads sensitive dataredrive_webhook_deliverynetwork egressrevoke_keyreads sensitive dataset_webhooknetwork egressadd_creditsno sensitive capabilitycancel_jobno sensitive capabilitycreate_checkoutno sensitive capabilitycreate_creator_profileno sensitive capability
Show 35 more tools ↓
create_keyno sensitive capabilitydelete_accountno sensitive capabilitydelete_creator_profileno sensitive capabilityexport_usageno sensitive capabilitygenerate_hooksno sensitive capabilitygenerate_hooks_batchno sensitive capabilityget_accountno sensitive capabilityget_activityno sensitive capabilityget_creator_profileno sensitive capabilityget_estimatesno sensitive capabilityget_jobno sensitive capabilityget_usageno sensitive capabilityget_webhookno sensitive capabilitygetting_startedno sensitive capabilityhealthno sensitive capabilitylist_archetypesno sensitive capabilitylist_billing_eventsno sensitive capabilitylist_creator_profilesno sensitive capabilitylist_hooksno sensitive capabilitylist_jobsno sensitive capabilitylist_outcomesno sensitive capabilitylist_runsno sensitive capabilitylist_webhook_deliveriesno sensitive capabilitypricingno sensitive capabilityquoteno sensitive capabilityremix_hookno sensitive capabilityreport_outcomeno sensitive capabilityresearch_hook_evidenceno sensitive capabilityscore_hookno sensitive capabilityscore_hooks_batchno sensitive capabilitysignupno sensitive capabilitystart_generate_jobno sensitive capabilitysynthesize_hooksno sensitive capabilityupdate_creator_profileno sensitive capabilitywait_for_jobno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
Versions 9
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.2.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v3.1.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-30 |
v3.0.19 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v3.0.10 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-23 |
v3.0.3 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-22 |
Show 4 more versions ↓
v2.7.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-21 |
v2.5.0 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-20 |
v2.4.0 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
v2.3.0 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-13 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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