Emcp MCP Server
emcp
PyPI
v0.3.0
Published by slezica — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Essentials MCP server with filesystem, shell, and web tools
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Tool "shell_run" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "shell_run" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool shell_run
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/emcp/fs.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/emcp/fs.py:112`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ath=path) result = subprocess.run( ["rg", "--line-number", "--color", "never", pattern, str(p)], ca
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/emcp/fs.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/emcp/shell.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/emcp/shell.py:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: =command) result = subprocess.run( [command] + arguments, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=su
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/emcp/shell.py
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([web_search, web_fetch]) co-exist with external-action tools ([shell_run]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [web_search, web_fetch] → sinks [shell_run]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow web_search → shell_run
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "web_fetch"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "web_fetch" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool web_fetch · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "shell_run"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "shell_run" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool shell_run · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "shell_run" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "shell_run" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool shell_run
Tools 12
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
shell_runruns code / shellweb_fetchingests untrusted inputweb_searchingests untrusted inputfs_listno sensitive capabilityfs_mkdirno sensitive capabilityfs_pwdno sensitive capabilityfs_readno sensitive capabilityfs_replaceno sensitive capabilityfs_rmno sensitive capabilityfs_searchno sensitive capability
Show 2 more tools ↓
fs_statno sensitive capabilityfs_writeno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (12 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan emcp --online --registry pypiMore in Web, Search & Scraping
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