Ember Cli MCP Server
ember-cli-mcp
npm
v0.5.1
Source verified
Published by stefanoamorelli — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for Ember CLI commands and utilities
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Tool "ember_run_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "ember_run_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "run_command" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool ember_run_command
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t { exec, spawn } from "child_process"; import { promisify } from "util"; import { readdir, stat, readFile } from "fs/pr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/index.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/index.ts:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t { exec, spawn } from "child_process"; import { promisify } from "util"; import { readdir, stat, readFile } from "fs/pr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/index.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (test-runner.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`test-runner.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); async function sleep(ms) { return new Promise(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test-runner.js
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "ember_run_command"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "ember_run_command" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool ember_run_command · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "ember_run_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ember_run_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ember_run_command
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (test/test-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`test/test-mcp.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; async function testMcpServer() { console.log("🧪 Testing Ember CLI MCP Server
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test/test-mcp.js
Tools 116
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
ember_run_commandruns code / shellacceptance-testno sensitive capabilityadapterno sensitive capabilityadapter-testno sensitive capabilityaddonno sensitive capabilityaddon-importno sensitive capabilityaddon-nameno sensitive capabilityappno sensitive capabilityapp-nameno sensitive capabilityasset-sizesno sensitive capability
Show 106 more tools ↓
blueprintno sensitive capabilitybuildno sensitive capabilityci-providerno sensitive capabilityclassicno sensitive capabilitycommand-nameno sensitive capabilitycomponentno sensitive capabilitycomponent-classno sensitive capabilitycomponent-testno sensitive capabilityconfig-fileno sensitive capabilitycontrollerno sensitive capabilitycontroller-testno sensitive capabilitydestroyno sensitive capabilitydirectoryno sensitive capabilitydry-runno sensitive capabilitydummyno sensitive capabilityember_build_testno sensitive capabilityember_list_addonsno sensitive capabilityember_list_blueprintsno sensitive capabilityember_project_infono sensitive capabilityember_stop_serverno sensitive capabilityember_test_server_runno sensitive capabilityember_test_server_startno sensitive capabilityember-datano sensitive capabilityembroiderno sensitive capabilityenvironmentno sensitive capabilityfilterno sensitive capabilitygenerateno sensitive capabilityglob-patternno sensitive capabilityhelpno sensitive capabilityhelperno sensitive capabilityhelper-testno sensitive capabilityhostno sensitive capabilityhttp-mockno sensitive capabilityhttp-proxyno sensitive capabilityinno sensitive capabilityin-repo-addonno sensitive capabilityinitno sensitive capabilityinitializerno sensitive capabilityinitializer-testno sensitive capabilityinstallno sensitive capabilityinstance-initializerno sensitive capabilityinstance-initializer-testno sensitive capabilityinteractiveno sensitive capabilityjsonno sensitive capabilitylangno sensitive capabilitylaunchno sensitive capabilitylibno sensitive capabilitylint-fixno sensitive capabilitylive-reloadno sensitive capabilitylive-reload-base-urlno sensitive capabilitylive-reload-hostno sensitive capabilitylive-reload-portno sensitive capabilitylive-reload-prefixno sensitive capabilitymixinno sensitive capabilitymixin-testno sensitive capabilitymodelno sensitive capabilitymodel-testno sensitive capabilitymoduleno sensitive capabilitynameno sensitive capabilitynewno sensitive capabilityoutput-pathno sensitive capabilitypackage-managerno sensitive capabilitypathno sensitive capabilitypodno sensitive capabilityportno sensitive capabilityproxyno sensitive capabilityproxy-in-timeoutno sensitive capabilityproxy-out-timeoutno sensitive capabilityqueryno sensitive capabilityreporterno sensitive capabilityrouteno sensitive capabilityroute-testno sensitive capabilitysaveno sensitive capabilitysave-devno sensitive capabilitysave-exactno sensitive capabilitysecure-proxyno sensitive capabilityserializerno sensitive capabilityserializer-testno sensitive capabilityserveno sensitive capabilityserverno sensitive capabilityserviceno sensitive capabilityservice-testno sensitive capabilitysilentno sensitive capabilityskip-gitno sensitive capabilityskip-npmno sensitive capabilitysslno sensitive capabilityssl-certno sensitive capabilityssl-keyno sensitive capabilitystrictno sensitive capabilitysuppress-sizesno sensitive capabilitytemplateno sensitive capabilitytestno sensitive capabilitytest-pageno sensitive capabilitytest-portno sensitive capabilitytestem-debugno sensitive capabilitytransformno sensitive capabilitytransform-testno sensitive capabilitytransparent-proxyno sensitive capabilitytypescriptno sensitive capabilityutilno sensitive capabilityutil-testno sensitive capabilityverboseno sensitive capabilityversionno sensitive capabilitywatchno sensitive capabilitywatcherno sensitive capabilitywelcomeno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (116 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.5.1 latest |
A 94/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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