Mcpvault — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@elraian/mcpvault",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@elraian/mcpvault"
},
"server": {
"name": "@elraian/mcpvault"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 89,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"external-sink",
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (58 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: supabase_get_logs → export_redacted ⇒ github_create_issue. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink — and at least one leg is a direct schema wire (⇒), where a producer's output drops straight into a free-text parameter of the next tool, so the chain needs little agent cooperation. Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "supabase_get_logs → export_redacted → github_create_issue"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"supabase_get_logs"
],
"sources": [
"export_redacted",
"supabase_run_sql",
"supabase_get_logs"
],
"sinks": [
"github_create_issue",
"github_create_pull_request"
],
"path": [
"supabase_get_logs",
"export_redacted",
"github_create_issue"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "supabase_get_logs",
"to": "export_redacted",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "export_redacted",
"to": "github_create_issue",
"kind": "schema-wired"
}
],
"wired": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/upgrade.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/upgrade.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli/upgrade.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; import { c, spinner, confirm } from \"./prompt.js\"; import { VERSION } from \"../v",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/cli/upgrade.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/proxies/runner.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/proxies/runner.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/proxies/runner.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; import { getActiveCredentials } from \"../wrappers/common.js\"; import { logEvent",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/proxies/runner.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/cli/upgrade.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/upgrade.js:8`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli/upgrade.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch(`https://registry.npmjs.org/${PACKAGE}/latest`, { headers: { Accept: \"applicat",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/cli/upgrade.js",
"line": 8,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/proxies/airtable.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/proxies/airtable.js:12`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/proxies/airtable.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch(\"https://api.airtable.com/v0/meta/whoami\", { headers: {",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/proxies/airtable.js",
"line": 12,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/proxies/brave.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/proxies/brave.js:11`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/proxies/brave.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch(\"https://api.search.brave.com/res/v1/web/search?q=ping&count=1\", { headers",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/proxies/brave.js",
"line": 11,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/proxies/cloudflare.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/proxies/cloudflare.js:13`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/proxies/cloudflare.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch(\"https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/user/tokens/verify\", { headers: {",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/proxies/cloudflare.js",
"line": 13,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/proxies/datadog.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/proxies/datadog.js:15`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/proxies/datadog.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch(`https://api.${site}/api/v1/validate`, { headers: { \"D",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/proxies/datadog.js",
"line": 15,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/proxies/discord.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/proxies/discord.js:13`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/proxies/discord.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch(\"https://discord.com/api/v10/users/@me\", { headers: {",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/proxies/discord.js",
"line": 13,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/proxies/figma.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/proxies/figma.js:12`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/proxies/figma.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch(\"https://api.figma.com/v1/me\", { headers: { \"X-Figma-T",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/proxies/figma.js",
"line": 12,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/proxies/hubspot.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/proxies/hubspot.js:12`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/proxies/hubspot.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch(\"https://api.hubapi.com/oauth/v1/access-tokens/\" + encodeURIComponent(String(creds.access_",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/proxies/hubspot.js",
"line": 12,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/proxies/linear.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/proxies/linear.js:11`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/proxies/linear.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch(\"https://api.linear.app/graphql\", { method: \"POST\", header",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/proxies/linear.js",
"line": 11,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/proxies/notion.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/proxies/notion.js:11`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/proxies/notion.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch(\"https://api.notion.com/v1/users/me\", { headers: { Aut",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/proxies/notion.js",
"line": 11,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (examples/programmatic-usage/talk-to-vault-mcp.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`examples/programmatic-usage/talk-to-vault-mcp.mjs:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "examples/programmatic-usage/talk-to-vault-mcp.mjs"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; import { join } from \"node:path\"; const entry = join(process.cwd(), \"dist\",",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "examples/programmatic-usage/talk-to-vault-mcp.mjs",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (examples/programmatic-usage/talk-to-wrapper-mcp.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`examples/programmatic-usage/talk-to-wrapper-mcp.mjs:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "examples/programmatic-usage/talk-to-wrapper-mcp.mjs"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; import { join } from \"node:path\"; const entry = join(process.cwd(), \"dist\",",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "examples/programmatic-usage/talk-to-wrapper-mcp.mjs",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"supabase_get_logs"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"export_redacted",
"supabase_run_sql",
"supabase_get_logs"
],
"externalSink": [
"github_create_issue",
"github_create_pull_request"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"supabase_get_logs",
"export_redacted",
"github_create_issue"
],
"pathWired": true,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: supabase_get_logs → export_redacted ⇒ github_create_issue."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "unlock_vault",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lock_vault",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_accounts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_account",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_active",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "activate_account",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_account",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_account",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_account",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_redacted",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"dump\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "github_list_repos",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "github_get_repo",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "github_list_issues",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "github_create_issue",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"create_issue\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "github_list_pulls",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "github_get_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "github_search_code",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "github_get_authenticated_user",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "github_list_branches",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "github_create_pull_request",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"create_pull_request\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "github_list_workflow_runs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "github_get_workflow_run",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "stripe_list_customers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "stripe_retrieve_customer",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "stripe_list_charges",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "stripe_list_subscriptions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "stripe_retrieve",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "supabase_list_organizations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "supabase_list_projects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "supabase_get_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "supabase_get_project_url",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "supabase_get_publishable_keys",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "supabase_run_sql",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"run_sql\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "supabase_list_tables",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "supabase_list_extensions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "supabase_list_migrations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "supabase_apply_migration",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "supabase_list_edge_functions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "supabase_get_edge_function",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "supabase_deploy_edge_function",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "supabase_get_advisors",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "supabase_get_logs",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
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