ellmos-codecommander-mcp
npm
v1.3.24
Published by ellmos-ai — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
A developer-focused MCP server providing 21 tools for code analysis, JSON repair, encoding fix, import organization, Python runtime import diagnostics, structural Python editing, indentation checks, code generation, format conversion, diff, and regex test
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 7 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:24`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eSync, execSync } from "child_process"; import { promisify } from "util"; import { pathToFileURL, fileURLToPath } from "
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:2788`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const result = execSync(`which ${cmd}`, { encoding: 'utf-8' }).trim(); if (result)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
cc_analyze_codeno sensitive capabilitycc_analyze_methodsno sensitive capabilitycc_check_indentationno sensitive capabilitycc_cleanup_fileno sensitive capabilitycc_convert_formatno sensitive capabilitycc_diagnose_importsno sensitive capabilitycc_diff_filesno sensitive capabilitycc_extract_classesno sensitive capabilitycc_fix_encodingno sensitive capabilitycc_fix_jsonno sensitive capabilitycc_fix_umlautsno sensitive capabilitycc_generate_licensesno sensitive capabilitycc_generate_python_codeno sensitive capabilitycc_get_languageno sensitive capabilitycc_md_to_htmlno sensitive capabilitycc_md_to_pdfno sensitive capabilitycc_organize_importsno sensitive capabilitycc_python_structural_editno sensitive capabilitycc_regex_testno sensitive capabilitycc_runtime_import_diagnoseno sensitive capabilitycc_scan_emojino sensitive capabilitycc_set_languageno sensitive capabilitycc_validate_jsonno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.3.24 latest |
B 87/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.3.23 |
B 87/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-06 |
v1.3.22 |
B 87/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v1.3.16 |
B 87/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-31 |
v1.3.14 |
B 87/100 | 2 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan ellmos-codecommander-mcp --online
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