elasticsearch-mcp-server
PyPI
v2.1.3
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP Server for interacting with Elasticsearch and OpenSearch
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 2 = 98. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/e2e/containers/conftest.py:171`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: arents[3] process = subprocess.Popen( [ sys.executable, "-m", "src.serve
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/e2e/containers/conftest.py
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/e2e/k8s/conftest.py:38`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: imeout=300): return subprocess.run( command, input=input_text, text=True, capture_ou
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/e2e/k8s/conftest.py
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
analyze_textno sensitive capabilitycreate_data_streamno sensitive capabilitycreate_indexno sensitive capabilitydelete_aliasno sensitive capabilitydelete_by_queryno sensitive capabilitydelete_data_streamno sensitive capabilitydelete_documentno sensitive capabilitydelete_indexno sensitive capabilitygeneral_api_requestno sensitive capabilityget_aliasno sensitive capabilityget_cluster_healthno sensitive capabilityget_cluster_statsno sensitive capabilityget_data_streamno sensitive capabilityget_documentno sensitive capabilityget_indexno sensitive capabilityindex_documentno sensitive capabilitylist_aliasesno sensitive capabilitylist_indicesno sensitive capabilityput_aliasno sensitive capabilitysearch_documentsno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.1.3 latest |
A 98/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v2.1.2 |
A 98/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan elasticsearch-mcp-server --online --registry pypi
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