Fabric Api (einlogic) MCP Server
@einlogic/mcp-fabric-api
npm
v2.9.0
Published by @einlogic — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server for Microsoft Fabric REST APIs — enables data engineers and data analysts to use AI assistants beyond Copilot to build and manage Fabric components
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 12 = 88. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: lakehouse_download_file → git_get_credentials → lakehouse_upload_file. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow lakehouse_download_file → git_get_credentials → lakehouse_upload_file
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/tools/auth.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/tools/auth.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; import { formatToolError } from "../core/
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/auth.js
medium Tool "lakehouse_move_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "lakehouse_move_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "move_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool lakehouse_move_file
medium Tool "lakehouse_delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "lakehouse_delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool lakehouse_delete_file
low Mutating tool "lakehouse_move_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "lakehouse_move_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool lakehouse_move_file
low Mutating tool "lakehouse_delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "lakehouse_delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool lakehouse_delete_file
Tools 200
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
git_get_credentialsreads sensitive datalakehouse_delete_filewrites fileslakehouse_download_fileingests untrusted inputlakehouse_list_filesreads sensitive datalakehouse_move_filewrites fileslakehouse_upload_filenetwork egressauth_clear_token_cacheno sensitive capabilityauth_get_current_accountno sensitive capabilityauth_list_available_accountsno sensitive capabilityauth_switch_tenantno sensitive capability
Show 190 more tools ↓
catalog_searchno sensitive capabilitycopy_job_cancel_runno sensitive capabilitycopy_job_createno sensitive capabilitycopy_job_deleteno sensitive capabilitycopy_job_getno sensitive capabilitycopy_job_get_definitionno sensitive capabilitycopy_job_get_run_statusno sensitive capabilitycopy_job_listno sensitive capabilitycopy_job_list_runsno sensitive capabilitycopy_job_runno sensitive capabilitycopy_job_updateno sensitive capabilitycopy_job_update_definitionno sensitive capabilitydataflow_createno sensitive capabilitydataflow_deleteno sensitive capabilitydataflow_getno sensitive capabilitydataflow_get_definitionno sensitive capabilitydataflow_get_refresh_statusno sensitive capabilitydataflow_listno sensitive capabilitydataflow_refreshno sensitive capabilitydataflow_updateno sensitive capabilitydeployment_pipeline_assign_workspaceno sensitive capabilitydeployment_pipeline_createno sensitive capabilitydeployment_pipeline_deleteno sensitive capabilitydeployment_pipeline_deployno sensitive capabilitydeployment_pipeline_getno sensitive capabilitydeployment_pipeline_get_operationno sensitive capabilitydeployment_pipeline_listno sensitive capabilitydeployment_pipeline_list_operationsno sensitive capabilitydeployment_pipeline_list_stage_itemsno sensitive capabilitydeployment_pipeline_list_stagesno sensitive capabilitydeployment_pipeline_unassign_workspaceno sensitive capabilitydeployment_pipeline_updateno sensitive capabilityenvironment_cancel_publishno sensitive capabilityenvironment_createno sensitive capabilityenvironment_deleteno sensitive capabilityenvironment_delete_staging_custom_libraryno sensitive capabilityenvironment_export_published_external_librariesno sensitive capabilityenvironment_export_staging_external_librariesno sensitive capabilityenvironment_getno sensitive capabilityenvironment_get_definitionno sensitive capabilityenvironment_get_published_spark_computeno sensitive capabilityenvironment_get_staging_spark_computeno sensitive capabilityenvironment_import_staging_external_librariesno sensitive capabilityenvironment_listno sensitive capabilityenvironment_list_published_librariesno sensitive capabilityenvironment_list_staging_librariesno sensitive capabilityenvironment_publishno sensitive capabilityenvironment_remove_staging_external_libraryno sensitive capabilityenvironment_updateno sensitive capabilityenvironment_update_definitionno sensitive capabilityenvironment_update_staging_spark_computeno sensitive capabilityenvironment_upload_staging_custom_libraryno sensitive capabilityeventhouse_createno sensitive capabilityeventhouse_deleteno sensitive capabilityeventhouse_execute_kqlno sensitive capabilityeventhouse_getno sensitive capabilityeventhouse_get_sql_endpointno sensitive capabilityeventhouse_listno sensitive capabilityeventhouse_updateno sensitive capabilityeventstream_createno sensitive capabilityeventstream_deleteno sensitive capabilityeventstream_getno sensitive capabilityeventstream_get_definitionno sensitive capabilityeventstream_listno sensitive capabilityeventstream_updateno sensitive capabilityeventstream_update_definitionno sensitive capabilityexternal_data_share_createno sensitive capabilityexternal_data_share_getno sensitive capabilityexternal_data_share_listno sensitive capabilityexternal_data_share_revokeno sensitive capabilityfolder_createno sensitive capabilityfolder_deleteno sensitive capabilityfolder_getno sensitive capabilityfolder_listno sensitive capabilityfolder_moveno sensitive capabilityfolder_updateno sensitive capabilitygit_commit_to_gitno sensitive capabilitygit_connectno sensitive capabilitygit_disconnectno sensitive capabilitygit_get_connectionno sensitive capabilitygit_get_statusno sensitive capabilitygit_initialize_connectionno sensitive capabilitygit_update_credentialsno sensitive capabilitygit_update_from_gitno sensitive capabilitygraphql_api_createno sensitive capabilitygraphql_api_deleteno sensitive capabilitygraphql_api_execute_queryno sensitive capabilitygraphql_api_getno sensitive capabilitygraphql_api_get_definitionno sensitive capabilitygraphql_api_listno sensitive capabilitygraphql_api_updateno sensitive capabilitykql_dashboard_createno sensitive capabilitykql_dashboard_deleteno sensitive capabilitykql_dashboard_getno sensitive capabilitykql_dashboard_get_definitionno sensitive capabilitykql_dashboard_listno sensitive capabilitykql_dashboard_updateno sensitive capabilitykql_dashboard_update_definitionno sensitive capabilitykql_database_createno sensitive capabilitykql_database_deleteno sensitive capabilitykql_database_getno sensitive capabilitykql_database_get_definitionno sensitive capabilitykql_database_listno sensitive capabilitykql_database_updateno sensitive capabilitykql_database_update_definitionno sensitive capabilitykql_queryset_createno sensitive capabilitykql_queryset_deleteno sensitive capabilitykql_queryset_getno sensitive capabilitykql_queryset_get_definitionno sensitive capabilitykql_queryset_listno sensitive capabilitykql_queryset_updateno sensitive capabilitykql_queryset_update_definitionno sensitive capabilitylakehouse_createno sensitive capabilitylakehouse_create_folderno sensitive capabilitylakehouse_create_shortcutno sensitive capabilitylakehouse_deleteno sensitive capabilitylakehouse_delete_shortcutno sensitive capabilitylakehouse_getno sensitive capabilitylakehouse_get_definitionno sensitive capabilitylakehouse_get_file_propertiesno sensitive capabilitylakehouse_get_shortcutno sensitive capabilitylakehouse_get_sql_endpointno sensitive capabilitylakehouse_listno sensitive capabilitylakehouse_list_shortcutsno sensitive capabilitylakehouse_list_tablesno sensitive capabilitylakehouse_load_tableno sensitive capabilitylakehouse_updateno sensitive capabilitylakehouse_update_definitionno sensitive capabilitymirrored_database_createno sensitive capabilitymirrored_database_deleteno sensitive capabilitymirrored_database_getno sensitive capabilitymirrored_database_get_definitionno sensitive capabilitymirrored_database_get_mirroring_statusno sensitive capabilitymirrored_database_get_tables_mirroring_statusno sensitive capabilitymirrored_database_listno sensitive capabilitymirrored_database_start_mirroringno sensitive capabilitymirrored_database_stop_mirroringno sensitive capabilitymirrored_database_updateno sensitive capabilitymirrored_database_update_definitionno sensitive capabilityml_experiment_createno sensitive capabilityml_experiment_deleteno sensitive capabilityml_experiment_getno sensitive capabilityml_experiment_listno sensitive capabilityml_experiment_updateno sensitive capabilityml_model_createno sensitive capabilityml_model_deleteno sensitive capabilityml_model_getno sensitive capabilityml_model_listno sensitive capabilityml_model_updateno sensitive capabilitynotebook_attach_environmentno sensitive capabilitynotebook_cancel_runno sensitive capabilitynotebook_createno sensitive capabilitynotebook_deleteno sensitive capabilitynotebook_detach_environmentno sensitive capabilitynotebook_getno sensitive capabilitynotebook_get_definitionno sensitive capabilitynotebook_get_livy_logno sensitive capabilitynotebook_get_livy_sessionno sensitive capabilitynotebook_get_run_statusno sensitive capabilitynotebook_listno sensitive capabilitynotebook_list_livy_sessionsno sensitive capabilitynotebook_runno sensitive capabilitynotebook_updateno sensitive capabilitynotebook_update_definitionno sensitive capabilityonelake_delete_data_access_roleno sensitive capabilityonelake_get_data_access_roleno sensitive capabilityonelake_list_data_access_rolesno sensitive capabilityonelake_set_data_access_roleno sensitive capabilitypipeline_cancel_runno sensitive capabilitypipeline_createno sensitive capabilitypipeline_create_scheduleno sensitive capabilitypipeline_deleteno sensitive capabilitypipeline_delete_scheduleno sensitive capabilitypipeline_getno sensitive capabilitypipeline_get_definitionno sensitive capabilitypipeline_get_run_statusno sensitive capabilitypipeline_listno sensitive capabilitypipeline_list_runsno sensitive capabilitypipeline_list_schedulesno sensitive capabilitypipeline_query_activity_runsno sensitive capabilitypipeline_runno sensitive capabilitypipeline_updateno sensitive capabilitypipeline_update_definitionno sensitive capabilitypipeline_update_scheduleno sensitive capabilityreflex_createno sensitive capabilityreflex_deleteno sensitive capabilityreflex_getno sensitive capabilityreflex_get_definitionno sensitive capabilityreflex_listno sensitive capabilityreflex_updateno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (200 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.9.0 latest |
B 88/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v2.8.0 |
A 92/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @einlogic/mcp-fabric-api --onlineOther implementations of Fabric Api 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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