Eh Smb MCP Server
eh-smb-mcp
PyPI
v0.2.1
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 2.1 = 98. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −2.1 | Package has no source repository MTC-SUP-011 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 98 − 8 = 90. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −5 | publisher verification (unlocatable) — no provenance and no public repository to inspect |
| ✓ | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "list_network_directory"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "list_network_directory" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool list_network_directory · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "file_path" on "read_network_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "read_network_file" takes a path parameter "file_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool read_network_file · inputSchema.properties.file_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "file_path" on "write_network_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "write_network_file" takes a path parameter "file_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool write_network_file · inputSchema.properties.file_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "file_path" on "delete_network_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "delete_network_file" takes a path parameter "file_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool delete_network_file · inputSchema.properties.file_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "directory_path" on "create_network_directory"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "create_network_directory" takes a path parameter "directory_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool create_network_directory · inputSchema.properties.directory_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "get_network_file_info"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "get_network_file_info" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool get_network_file_info · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "source_path" on "copy_from_network"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "copy_from_network" takes a path parameter "source_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool copy_from_network · inputSchema.properties.source_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "dest_path" on "copy_to_network"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "copy_to_network" takes a path parameter "dest_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool copy_to_network · inputSchema.properties.dest_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "rename_network_item"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "rename_network_item" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool rename_network_item · inputSchema.properties.path
low Package has no source repositoryMTC-SUP-011
"eh-smb-mcp" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.
Fix: Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.
Location: package eh-smb-mcp
Tools 12
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
copy_from_networkreads sensitive datacopy_to_networkreads sensitive datacreate_network_directoryreads sensitive datadelete_network_filereads sensitive dataget_network_file_inforeads sensitive datalist_network_directoryreads sensitive dataread_network_filereads sensitive datarename_network_itemreads sensitive datawrite_network_filereads sensitive dataget_share_infono sensitive capabilitymove_in_networkno sensitive capabilityrename_network_batchno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (12 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.1 latest |
A 90/100 | 10 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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