Echo (bala-2305) MCP Server
echo-mcp
PyPI
v0.1.7
Published by bala-2305 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
A powerful MCP server for local system automation and browser control
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (config.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`config.py:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, text=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server config.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/echo_mcp/config.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/echo_mcp/config.py:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, text=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/echo_mcp/config.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/echo_mcp/main.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/echo_mcp/main.py:77`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: """ result = subprocess.run( ["powershell", "-NoProfile", "-ExecutionPolicy", "RemoteSigned", "-
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/echo_mcp/main.py
medium Tool "delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool delete_file
low Mutating tool "delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool delete_file
Tools 58
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
browser_get_page_sourceingests untrusted inputbrowser_get_titleingests untrusted inputdelete_filewrites filesdownload_fileingests untrusted inputget_environment_variablereads sensitive dataread_file_contentreads sensitive dataweb_scrape_to_fileingests untrusted inputbrowser_clickno sensitive capabilitybrowser_closeno sensitive capabilitybrowser_execute_scriptno sensitive capability
Show 48 more tools ↓
browser_extract_textno sensitive capabilitybrowser_fill_formno sensitive capabilitybrowser_find_elementno sensitive capabilitybrowser_get_urlno sensitive capabilitybrowser_navigateno sensitive capabilitybrowser_openno sensitive capabilitybrowser_screenshotno sensitive capabilitybrowser_scrollno sensitive capabilitybrowser_wait_for_elementno sensitive capabilityclick_elementno sensitive capabilityclose_all_windows_by_titleno sensitive capabilitycreate_directoryno sensitive capabilityfind_text_on_screenno sensitive capabilityfocus_windowno sensitive capabilityget_active_window_infono sensitive capabilityget_clipboardno sensitive capabilityget_disk_usageno sensitive capabilityget_mouse_positionno sensitive capabilityget_process_statsno sensitive capabilityget_screen_sizeno sensitive capabilityget_system_healthno sensitive capabilityget_text_at_coordsno sensitive capabilityget_window_geometryno sensitive capabilityhotkeyno sensitive capabilitykill_processno sensitive capabilitylaunch_applicationno sensitive capabilitylist_all_windowsno sensitive capabilitylist_directoryno sensitive capabilitylist_network_interfacesno sensitive capabilitylist_processesno sensitive capabilitymaximize_windowno sensitive capabilityminimize_windowno sensitive capabilitymouse_clickno sensitive capabilitymouse_double_clickno sensitive capabilitymouse_dragno sensitive capabilitymouse_scrollno sensitive capabilitymove_mouseno sensitive capabilityopen_urlno sensitive capabilitypingno sensitive capabilitypress_keyno sensitive capabilityset_clipboardno sensitive capabilityset_volumeno sensitive capabilitysystem_powerno sensitive capabilitytake_screenshotno sensitive capabilitytype_textno sensitive capabilitywaitno sensitive capabilitywait_for_processno sensitive capabilitywrite_to_fileno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (58 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.7 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan echo-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Echo 4
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 5 side by side →
一个简单的MCP服务器，提供echo功能：输入什么就返回什么。支持延迟返回功能。
A minimal MCP server template that echoes messages
A simple MCP server with an echo tool
Security scan results for the Echo (npm) MCP server.
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