Easyeda Mcp Pro MCP Server
easyeda-mcp-pro
npm
v1.0.1
Source verified
Published by oaslananka — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for EasyEDA Pro: PCB inspection, BOM, exports, and hardware review.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/client-definitions.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/client-definitions.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; // ── Constants ─────────────────────────────────────────────── export const SER
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/client-definitions.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/local-setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/local-setup.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; import { ToolRegistry } from '../tools/re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/local-setup.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/simulation/runner.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/simulation/runner.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; import { mkdtemp, rm, writeFile } from 'n
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/simulation/runner.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/check-runtime.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/check-runtime.mjs:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs'; import { dirname, resolve } from 'node:p
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/check-runtime.mjs
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 6
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.1 latest |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.0.0 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-28 |
v0.35.4 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
v0.35.3 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
v0.35.2 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Show 1 more version ↓
v0.35.0 |
A 100/100 | 3 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-22 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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