Easybrowser MCP Server
easybrowser-mcp
npm
v1.1.0
Published by easybrowsermaster — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP Server for EasyBrowser fingerprint browser automation. Use in Kiro, Claude, Cursor, Cline, Windsurf, etc.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Tool "browser_run_code" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "browser_run_code" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "run_code" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool browser_run_code
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/server.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/server.js:1028`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e; } })()`; await vm.runInContext(snippet, context); if (context.error) throw context.error; return ok
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/server.js
low Mutating tool "browser_run_code" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "browser_run_code" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool browser_run_code
Tools 29
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
browser_run_coderuns code / shellbrowser_clickno sensitive capabilitybrowser_console_messagesno sensitive capabilitybrowser_evaluateno sensitive capabilitybrowser_get_urlno sensitive capabilitybrowser_hoverno sensitive capabilitybrowser_navigateno sensitive capabilitybrowser_navigate_backno sensitive capabilitybrowser_network_requestsno sensitive capabilitybrowser_press_keyno sensitive capability
Show 19 more tools ↓
browser_scrollno sensitive capabilitybrowser_select_optionno sensitive capabilitybrowser_snapshotno sensitive capabilitybrowser_tabsno sensitive capabilitybrowser_take_screenshotno sensitive capabilitybrowser_typeno sensitive capabilitybrowser_wait_forno sensitive capabilityeasybrowser_aboutno sensitive capabilityenv_closeno sensitive capabilityenv_createno sensitive capabilityenv_deleteno sensitive capabilityenv_get_2fano sensitive capabilityenv_listno sensitive capabilityenv_list_runningno sensitive capabilityenv_openno sensitive capabilityenv_sessionsno sensitive capabilityenv_statusno sensitive capabilityenv_stop_browserno sensitive capabilityenv_updateno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (29 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan easybrowser-mcp --onlineMore in Browser Automation
Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that integrates AgentQL data extraction capabilities.
Screenshot any URL or HTML as PNG/JPEG/WebP from your AI agent. Full-page, clean, no install.
MCP server for aria51 accessibility scanner
Bridge any browser web app to Claude Code via MCP
Browserbase’s official MCP server: cloud headless browsers for agents, with sessions and screenshots.
MCP server for AI web browser automation using Browserbase and Stagehand