Easy Notion MCP Server
easy-notion-mcp
npm
v1.1.0
Source verified
Published by grey-iris — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Token-efficient, markdown-first Notion MCP server where agents write markdown instead of raw Notion JSON.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/init.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/init.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { createInterface } from "node:readline/promises"; import { stdin as proc
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/init.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/auth/oauth-provider.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/auth/oauth-provider.js:97`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t tokenResponse = await fetch("https://api.notion.com/v1/oauth/token", { method: "POST",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auth/oauth-provider.js
Tools 47
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_databasereads sensitive dataproperty-paginationreads sensitive dataquery_databasereads sensitive dataadd_commentno sensitive capabilityadd_database_entriesno sensitive capabilityadd_database_entryno sensitive capabilityappend_contentno sensitive capabilityarchive_pageno sensitive capabilityarchive_toggleno sensitive capabilitycreate_databaseno sensitive capability
Show 37 more tools ↓
create_pageno sensitive capabilitycreate_page_from_fileno sensitive capabilitycreate_viewno sensitive capabilitydelete_database_entryno sensitive capabilitydelete_viewno sensitive capabilityduplicate_pageno sensitive capabilityfind_replaceno sensitive capabilityget_configno sensitive capabilityget_meno sensitive capabilityget_viewno sensitive capabilitylist_commentsno sensitive capabilitylist_databasesno sensitive capabilitylist_pagesno sensitive capabilitylist_usersno sensitive capabilitylist_viewsno sensitive capabilitymarkdown-conventionsno sensitive capabilitymove_pageno sensitive capabilityquery_viewno sensitive capabilityread_blockno sensitive capabilityread_pageno sensitive capabilityread_sectionno sensitive capabilityread_toggleno sensitive capabilityreplace_contentno sensitive capabilityrestore_pageno sensitive capabilityrestore_toggleno sensitive capabilitysearchno sensitive capabilitysearch_in_pageno sensitive capabilityshare_pageno sensitive capabilityupdate_blockno sensitive capabilityupdate_data_sourceno sensitive capabilityupdate_database_entryno sensitive capabilityupdate_pageno sensitive capabilityupdate_sectionno sensitive capabilityupdate_toggleno sensitive capabilityupdate_viewno sensitive capabilityupdate-data-source-guideno sensitive capabilitywarning-shapesno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (47 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-28 |
v1.0.1 |
A 94/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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