E2b Sandbox MCP Server
e2b-sandbox-mcp
npm
v1.0.1
Published by asif-nvc — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server connecting Claude Code with E2B cloud sandboxes for working on any GitHub repo
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 11 = 89. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: sandbox_download_url → sandbox_file_list → sandbox_exec. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow sandbox_download_url → sandbox_file_list → sandbox_exec
high Tool "sandbox_exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "sandbox_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool sandbox_exec
high Tool "sandbox_exec_background" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "sandbox_exec_background" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool sandbox_exec_background
low Mutating tool "sandbox_exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "sandbox_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool sandbox_exec
low Mutating tool "sandbox_exec_background" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "sandbox_exec_background" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool sandbox_exec_background
Tools 29
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
sandbox_download_urlingests untrusted inputnetwork egresssandbox_execruns code / shellsandbox_exec_backgroundruns code / shellsandbox_file_listreads sensitive datasandbox_file_readingests untrusted inputsandbox_get_urlingests untrusted inputsandbox_git_cloneingests untrusted inputsandbox_git_pullingests untrusted inputsandbox_killingests untrusted inputsandbox_upload_urlingests untrusted input
Show 19 more tools ↓
sandbox_createno sensitive capabilitysandbox_file_existsno sensitive capabilitysandbox_file_infono sensitive capabilitysandbox_file_mkdirno sensitive capabilitysandbox_file_removeno sensitive capabilitysandbox_file_renameno sensitive capabilitysandbox_file_writeno sensitive capabilitysandbox_git_branchno sensitive capabilitysandbox_git_commitno sensitive capabilitysandbox_git_initno sensitive capabilitysandbox_git_pushno sensitive capabilitysandbox_git_statusno sensitive capabilitysandbox_infono sensitive capabilitysandbox_keep_aliveno sensitive capabilitysandbox_listno sensitive capabilitysandbox_pauseno sensitive capabilitysandbox_process_killno sensitive capabilitysandbox_process_listno sensitive capabilitysandbox_resumeno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (29 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.1 latest |
B 89/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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