Chromedebug MCP Server
@dynamicu/chromedebug-mcp
npm
v2.7.8
Published by @dynamicu — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
ChromeDebug MCP - MCP server that provides full control over a Chrome browser instance for debugging and automation with AI assistants like Claude Code
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 10.6 = 89. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −9.5 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×2 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 89 − 8 = 81. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 13
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/chrome-controller.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/chrome-controller.js:1976`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const fn = new Function('element', code); return { success: true, resul
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/chrome-controller.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/commands/install-pro.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/commands/install-pro.js:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import AdmZip from 'adm-zip'; // Constants const CHROMEDEBUG_DIR = path.join(os
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/commands/install-pro.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/database.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/database.js:2085`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: exec } = await import('child_process'); const { promisify } = await import('util'); const execAsync = promisify
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/database.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/services/git-safety-service.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/services/git-safety-service.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { existsSync, statSync, mkdirSync, copyFileSync, rmSync } from 'fs'; impo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/services/git-safety-service.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/services/process-manager.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/services/process-manager.js:82`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawn } = await import('child_process'); return new Promise((resolve) => { const ps = spawn('ps', ['aux'], {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/services/process-manager.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/services/process-tracker.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/services/process-tracker.js:314`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawn } = await import('child_process'); return new Promise((resolve) => { const ps = spawn('ps', ['aux'], {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/services/process-tracker.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/services/unified-session-manager.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/services/unified-session-manager.js:546`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); // Get process command line const cmd = execSync(`ps -p ${pid} -o
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/services/unified-session-manager.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/services/git-safety-service.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/services/git-safety-service.js:433`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: g untracked files execSync(`git stash push -u -m "${stashMessage}"`, { cwd: projectPath, encoding:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/services/git-safety-service.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/services/unified-session-manager.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/services/unified-session-manager.js:549`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: line const cmd = execSync(`ps -p ${pid} -o command=`, { encoding: 'utf8' }).trim(); // Check if it's a Chr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/services/unified-session-manager.js
low Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (chrome-extension/pro/jszip.min.js)MTC-SRC-001
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`chrome-extension/pro/jszip.min.js:13`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: function"!=typeof e&&(e=new Function(""+e));for(var t=new Array(arguments.length-1),r=0;r<t.length;r++)t[r]=arguments[r+
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server chrome-extension/pro/jszip.min.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/package-extension.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/package-extension.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: c, execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import archiver from 'archiver'; const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.meta.u
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/package-extension.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/package-pro-extension.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/package-pro-extension.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: c, execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import archiver from 'archiver'; const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.meta.u
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/package-pro-extension.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@dynamicu/chromedebug-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: npm run update-extension-config && node scripts/postinstall.js
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @dynamicu/chromedebug-mcp
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.7.8 latest |
B 81/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v2.7.7 |
C 79/100 | 17 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-28 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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