Chromedebug MCP Server
@dynamicu/chromedebug-mcp
npm
v2.7.7
Published by @dynamicu — no publish provenance and no vendor-owned scope, so the publisher could not be verified. The repository link below is self-declared.
Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −40.7 | Hardcoded Google API key in server code ×4 MTC-SRC-008 | exfiltration |
| −9.5 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×2 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
| −6.3 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
| −2.1 | Package has no source repository MTC-SUP-011 | supply-chain |
Grade capped: 4 confirmed high findings → grade capped at D. A hard gate overrides the point total — no amount of clean surface buys back a confirmed catastrophe.
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.
Findings 18
high Hardcoded Google API key in server code (chrome-extension/firebase-config.js)MTC-SRC-008
A live-looking Google API key is hardcoded in `chrome-extension/firebase-config.js:12`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.
Evidence: Google API key: AIza…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server chrome-extension/firebase-config.js
high Hardcoded Google API key in server code (chrome-extension/firebase-config.module.js)MTC-SRC-008
A live-looking Google API key is hardcoded in `chrome-extension/firebase-config.module.js:12`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.
Evidence: Google API key: AIza…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server chrome-extension/firebase-config.module.js
high Hardcoded Google API key in server code (chrome-extension/firebase-config.public-sw.js)MTC-SRC-008
A live-looking Google API key is hardcoded in `chrome-extension/firebase-config.public-sw.js:14`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.
Evidence: Google API key: AIza…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server chrome-extension/firebase-config.public-sw.js
high Hardcoded Google API key in server code (chrome-extension/firebase-config.public.js)MTC-SRC-008
A live-looking Google API key is hardcoded in `chrome-extension/firebase-config.public.js:19`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.
Evidence: Google API key: AIza…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server chrome-extension/firebase-config.public.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (chrome-extension/pro/jszip.min.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`chrome-extension/pro/jszip.min.js:13`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: new Function(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server chrome-extension/pro/jszip.min.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/chrome-controller.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/chrome-controller.js:1923`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: new Function(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/chrome-controller.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (scripts/package-extension.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`scripts/package-extension.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/package-extension.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (scripts/package-pro-extension.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`scripts/package-pro-extension.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/package-pro-extension.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/commands/install-pro.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/commands/install-pro.js:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/commands/install-pro.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/database.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/database.js:2085`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/database.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/services/git-safety-service.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/services/git-safety-service.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/services/git-safety-service.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/services/process-manager.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/services/process-manager.js:82`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/services/process-manager.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/services/process-tracker.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/services/process-tracker.js:314`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/services/process-tracker.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/services/unified-session-manager.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/services/unified-session-manager.js:546`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/services/unified-session-manager.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/services/git-safety-service.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/services/git-safety-service.js:433`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execSync(`git stash push -u -m "${
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/services/git-safety-service.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/services/unified-session-manager.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/services/unified-session-manager.js:549`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execSync(`ps -p ${
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/services/unified-session-manager.js
medium Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@dynamicu/chromedebug-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. The large majority of malicious packages abuse install hooks to run code before you ever import them.
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @dynamicu/chromedebug-mcp
low Package has no source repositoryMTC-SUP-011
"@dynamicu/chromedebug-mcp" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.
Fix: Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.
Location: package @dynamicu/chromedebug-mcp
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.7.7 latest |
F 41/100 | 18 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-22 |
Embed this score
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Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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