Dynadot (mikusnuz) MCP Server

dynadot-mcp npm v1.3.2

Published by mikusnuz — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

MCP server for the Dynadot domain registrar API — manage domains, DNS, contacts, transfers, and more

Trust grade
A
96/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 96/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Moderate
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 96/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−3 capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([buy_expired_domain]) co-exist with external-action tools ([set_email_forward]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [buy_expired_domain] → sinks [set_email_forward]

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow buy_expired_domain → set_email_forward

Tools 67

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • buy_expired_domainingests untrusted input
  • set_email_forwardnetwork egress
  • add_nameserverno sensitive capability
  • authorize_transfer_awayno sensitive capability
  • bulk_register_domainsno sensitive capability
  • buy_it_nowno sensitive capability
  • cancel_transferno sensitive capability
  • check_processingno sensitive capability
  • clear_domain_settingno sensitive capability
  • confirm_marketplace_actionno sensitive capability
Show 57 more tools ↓
  • create_contactno sensitive capability
  • create_folderno sensitive capability
  • delete_contactno sensitive capability
  • delete_domainno sensitive capability
  • delete_folderno sensitive capability
  • delete_nameserverno sensitive capability
  • edit_contactno sensitive capability
  • get_account_balanceno sensitive capability
  • get_account_infono sensitive capability
  • get_auction_detailsno sensitive capability
  • get_auctionsno sensitive capability
  • get_auth_codeno sensitive capability
  • get_dnsno sensitive capability
  • get_dnssecno sensitive capability
  • get_domain_infono sensitive capability
  • get_marketplace_listingsno sensitive capability
  • get_nameserversno sensitive capability
  • get_order_statusno sensitive capability
  • get_tld_priceno sensitive capability
  • get_transfer_statusno sensitive capability
  • list_contactsno sensitive capability
  • list_couponsno sensitive capability
  • list_domainsno sensitive capability
  • list_foldersno sensitive capability
  • list_ordersno sensitive capability
  • list_registered_nameserversno sensitive capability
  • lock_domainno sensitive capability
  • manage_backorder_auctionsno sensitive capability
  • manage_backordersno sensitive capability
  • manage_cn_auditno sensitive capability
  • manage_domain_pushno sensitive capability
  • place_bidno sensitive capability
  • push_domainno sensitive capability
  • register_domainno sensitive capability
  • register_nameserverno sensitive capability
  • rename_folderno sensitive capability
  • renew_domainno sensitive capability
  • restore_domainno sensitive capability
  • search_domainno sensitive capability
  • set_account_defaultsno sensitive capability
  • set_auth_codeno sensitive capability
  • set_contact_regional_settingno sensitive capability
  • set_dnsno sensitive capability
  • set_dnssecno sensitive capability
  • set_domain_noteno sensitive capability
  • set_folder_settingsno sensitive capability
  • set_for_saleno sensitive capability
  • set_forwardingno sensitive capability
  • set_hostingno sensitive capability
  • set_nameserver_ipno sensitive capability
  • set_nameserversno sensitive capability
  • set_parkingno sensitive capability
  • set_privacyno sensitive capability
  • set_renew_optionno sensitive capability
  • set_reseller_verificationno sensitive capability
  • set_whois_contactsno sensitive capability
  • transfer_domainno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 2

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.3.2 latest A 96/100 1 1.13.0 2026-09-07
v1.3.1 A 96/100 1 1.12.1 2026-08-06

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 96/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan dynadot-mcp --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

Other implementations of Dynadot 1

Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →

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