Strapi (dugleelabs) MCP Server

@dugleelabs/strapi-mcp-server npm v1.3.0

Published by @dugleelabs — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.

[![PR Validation](https://github.com/dugleelabs/strapi-mcp-server/actions/workflows/pull_request.yaml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/dugleelabs/strapi-mcp-server/actions/workflows/pull_request.yaml) [![Semantic Release](https://github.com/dugleelabs/strap

View on npm ↗ Raw report (JSON) ↗

Trust grade

95/100

Last scanned 2026-09-07 get badge →

Trust

A · 95/100

Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.

Capability

Moderate

Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.

Coverage

Source

How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.

A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 95/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 5 = 95. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

Points	Adoption-risk factor
−3	capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−2	publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/search-S5RDYMTN.js)MTC-SRC-003

In the server's implementation (`dist/search-S5RDYMTN.js:16`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: try { res = await fetch(`https://api.search.brave.com/res/v1/web/search?${qs}`, { headers: { Acc

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/search-S5RDYMTN.js

Tools 10

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

get_entryingests untrusted input
create_content_from_researchno sensitive capability
create_entryno sensitive capability
delete_entryno sensitive capability
generate_draftno sensitive capability
get_content_type_schemano sensitive capability
list_content_typesno sensitive capability
list_entriesno sensitive capability
research_topicno sensitive capability
update_entryno sensitive capability

What this scan could not see

Tools were statically extracted from the published source (10 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

Version	Score	Findings	Engine	Scanned
`v1.3.0` latest	A 95/100	1	1.13.0	2026-09-07

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

Markdown (GitHub README)

[![MCP Trust Score](https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/dugleelabs-strapi-mcp-server/badge.svg)](https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/dugleelabs-strapi-mcp-server)

HTML

<a href="https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/dugleelabs-strapi-mcp-server"><img src="https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/dugleelabs-strapi-mcp-server/badge.svg" alt="MCP Trust Score" height="20"></a>

Prefer shields.io styling? Point it at https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/dugleelabs-strapi-mcp-server/badge.json via https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=…

Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan @dugleelabs/strapi-mcp-server --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

Other implementations of Strapi 4

Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 5 side by side →

Strapi (l33tdawg) npm

strapi-mcp

An MCP server for your Strapi CMS that provides access to content types and entries through the MCP protocol

Content Management Score 99/100 0 findings 716/wk Cap. Minimal

Strapi (lapage) npm

@lapage/strapi-mcp

Model Context Protocol server for Strapi CMS content management.

API Development Score 96/100 0 findings 42/wk Cap. Moderate

Strapi (bschauer) npm

@bschauer/strapi-mcp-server

Model Context Protocol server implementation for Strapi CMS with enhanced security disclaimer and configuration

Content Management Score 95/100 0 findings 80/wk Cap. Moderate

Strapi (npm) npm

strapi-mcp-server

Expose Strapi v5 as a Model Context Protocol server with OAuth 2.1 + PKCE.

Content Management Score 92/100 2 findings 9/wk Cap. High

More in Developer Tools

1stay Source verified npm

1stay-mcp

Hotel booking MCP server — 300K+ properties, real confirmation numbers, loyalty programs. Builders monetize every booking via Stripe Connect. The first MCP server that completes real hotel reservations inside AI conversations.

Developer Tools Score 100/100 0 findings 17/wk Cap. Minimal

Adguard Home Source verified npm

@samik081/mcp-adguard-home

Manage AdGuard Home through AI assistants

Developer Tools Score 100/100 0 findings 243/wk Cap. Minimal

Ado Browser Source verified npm

mcp-ado-browser

Read-only Azure DevOps for MCP clients using only your existing browser session — no PAT, no Azure CLI. Browse work items, pull requests, comments, attachments and Artifacts feeds across every project, repo and feed you can access.

Developer Tools Score 100/100 0 findings 21/wk Cap. Minimal

Adobe Experience Dev Source verified npm

@stubbedev/adobe-experience-dev-mcp

MCP server for Adobe Experience Manager Assets integration development

Developer Tools Score 100/100 0 findings 34/wk Cap. Minimal

Aemet Source verified npm

@rldona/aemet-mcp

Servidor MCP para el tiempo oficial de España (API pública OpenData de AEMET). Predicción, observación y avisos como herramientas MCP tipadas.

Developer Tools Score 100/100 0 findings 17/wk Cap. Minimal

Affinity Mcp Bridge Source verified npm

affinity-mcp-bridge

A standalone MCP stdio bridge for Affinity by Canva's local MCP SSE server.