Slack (dudztroyer) MCP Server
@dudztroyer/slack-mcp-server
npm
v0.0.5
Published by @dudztroyer — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for interacting with Slack
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:30`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch(`https://slack.com/api/conversations.list?${params}`, { headers: this.botHeaders });
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
Tools 10
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
slack_post_markdown_messagenetwork egressslack_post_messagenetwork egressslack_add_reactionno sensitive capabilityslack_get_channel_historyno sensitive capabilityslack_get_thread_repliesno sensitive capabilityslack_get_user_profileno sensitive capabilityslack_get_usersno sensitive capabilityslack_list_channelsno sensitive capabilityslack_reply_to_threadno sensitive capabilityslack_reply_to_thread_markdownno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (10 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.0.5 latest |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @dudztroyer/slack-mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of Slack 29
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 30 side by side →
User-token (xoxp) Slack MCP server over stdio
Integrate the Slack Web API into agentic workflows via MCP
MCP server for Slack Web API — send messages, manage channels, search, reactions, files, pins, bookmarks, and more through 38 tools
MCP server for the Slack **Web API**, acting as a bot user (`xoxb-` token). A good fit for internal team notifications and reports.
Channel lookup, history, and messaging tools for Slack workspaces.
MCP Server for Slack API integration
More in AI & Agents
Authenticated MCP transport with HTTP Signatures for AAuth agents
Local-first MCP server for parallel AI coding agents to claim file ownership before edits, preventing stomping on each other in the same worktree.
Agent-agnostic intercommunication system — sessions, messaging, channels, shared state, and real-time events
MCP server for AI agent task communication and delegation with diagnostic lifecycle visibility
Programmatic add/link/unlink for MCP servers across 23 AI coding agents (Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor, VS Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Zed, Cline, OpenCode, Goose, Kiro, Windsurf, and more). Functional API with dry-run support.
MCP server layer exposing agent-mesh orchestrator as an MCP agent