Dritan MCP Server
@dritan/mcp
npm
v0.12.1
Source verified
Published by amirdauti — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for Dritan SDK market data and local Solana wallet swap execution
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { Server } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/index.js"; import { Std
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:454`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch("https://quickchart.io/chart/create", { method: "POST", headers: {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
Tools 42
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
wallet_get_token_performanceingests untrusted inputreads sensitive datamarket_get_snapshotingests untrusted inputths_get_scoreingests untrusted inputths_get_score_tokens_getingests untrusted inputths_get_score_tokens_postingests untrusted inputths_get_top_walletsingests untrusted inputtoken_get_aggregatedingests untrusted inputtoken_get_deployer_statsingests untrusted inputtoken_get_first_buyersingests untrusted inputtoken_get_metadataingests untrusted input
Show 32 more tools ↓
token_get_ohlcvingests untrusted inputtoken_get_priceingests untrusted inputtoken_get_riskingests untrusted inputwallet_get_holdingsingests untrusted inputwallet_get_holdings_pageingests untrusted inputwallet_get_performanceingests untrusted inputwallet_get_portfolio_chartingests untrusted inputwallet_get_summaryingests untrusted inputwallet_get_trade_historyingests untrusted inputauth_clear_api_keyno sensitive capabilityauth_set_api_keyno sensitive capabilityauth_statusno sensitive capabilitydritan_healthno sensitive capabilitymarket_stream_sampleno sensitive capabilityswap_buildno sensitive capabilityswap_build_sign_and_broadcastno sensitive capabilityswap_sign_and_broadcastno sensitive capabilitysystem_check_prereqsno sensitive capabilityths_healthno sensitive capabilitytoken_get_ohlcv_chartno sensitive capabilitytoken_searchno sensitive capabilitywallet_create_localno sensitive capabilitywallet_get_addressno sensitive capabilitywallet_get_balanceno sensitive capabilitywallet_get_holdings_chartno sensitive capabilitywallet_get_performance_chartno sensitive capabilitywallet_get_portfolio_chart_visualno sensitive capabilitywallet_stream_sampleno sensitive capabilitywallet_transfer_solno sensitive capabilityx402_create_api_keyno sensitive capabilityx402_create_api_key_quoteno sensitive capabilityx402_get_pricingno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (42 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.12.1 latest |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @dritan/mcp --onlineMore in Finance & Commerce
<img src="./public/logo.png" alt="1Money Logo" width="200"/>
Signed verification attestations for agent decisions: business, price, freshness, claim checks.
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The Adyen Model Context Protocol server allows you to integrate with Adyen APIs through LLMs function calling utilizing various Clients. It currently supports the following tools:
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