Drawdb MCP Server
drawdb-mcp
npm
v0.6.0
Published by iceyxsm — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/tools/browser.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/tools/browser.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { existsSync } from "node:fs"; import { homedir, platform, tmpdir } fro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/tools/browser.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/tools/browser.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`src/tools/browser.js:68`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const res = await fetch(`http://${host}:${port}/json`); if (!res.ok) { throw new Error( `Failed to
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/tools/browser.js
Tools 44
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
export_to_filenetwork egressadd_enumno sensitive capabilityadd_fieldno sensitive capabilityadd_indexno sensitive capabilityadd_noteno sensitive capabilityadd_relationshipno sensitive capabilityadd_tableno sensitive capabilityapply_templateno sensitive capabilitydescribe_relationshipno sensitive capabilitydescribe_tableno sensitive capability
Show 34 more tools ↓
design_schemano sensitive capabilityexplain_schemano sensitive capabilityexport_dbmlno sensitive capabilityexport_ddlno sensitive capabilityexport_deployment_bundleno sensitive capabilityexport_jsonno sensitive capabilityfind_drawdb_tabno sensitive capabilitygenerate_migrationno sensitive capabilityget_design_promptno sensitive capabilityget_schema_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_thinking_contextno sensitive capabilitylaunch_browserno sensitive capabilitylist_enumsno sensitive capabilitylist_relationshipsno sensitive capabilitylist_tablesno sensitive capabilitylist_templatesno sensitive capabilitylist_typesno sensitive capabilitynew_diagramno sensitive capabilityopen_in_drawdbno sensitive capabilityreload_drawdb_tabno sensitive capabilityremove_fieldno sensitive capabilityremove_relationshipno sensitive capabilityremove_tableno sensitive capabilityreset_thinkingno sensitive capabilityreview_schemano sensitive capabilitysearch_tablesno sensitive capabilitysnapshot_schemano sensitive capabilitythink_about_editno sensitive capabilitythink_about_reviewno sensitive capabilitythink_about_schemano sensitive capabilityupdate_fieldno sensitive capabilityupgrade_to_productionno sensitive capabilityvalidate_constraintsno sensitive capabilityvalidate_schema_qualityno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (44 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.6.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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