Vector Store MCP Server
@dotlab-hq/vector-store-mcp
npm
v1.0.0
Source verified
Published by dotlab-hq — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for OpenAI Vector Store API — manage vector stores, files, batches, and search.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([openai_list_files]) and tools that can send data out ([openai_upload_file, openai_attach_file_to_vector_store]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [openai_list_files] → sinks [openai_upload_file, openai_attach_file_to_vector_store]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow openai_list_files → openai_upload_file
medium Tool "openai_delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "openai_delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool openai_delete_file
low Mutating tool "openai_delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "openai_delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool openai_delete_file
Tools 21
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
openai_attach_file_to_vector_storenetwork egressopenai_delete_filewrites filesopenai_list_filesreads sensitive dataopenai_upload_filenetwork egressopenai_cancel_vector_store_file_batchno sensitive capabilityopenai_create_vector_storeno sensitive capabilityopenai_create_vector_store_file_batchno sensitive capabilityopenai_delete_vector_storeno sensitive capabilityopenai_delete_vector_store_fileno sensitive capabilityopenai_list_vector_store_file_batch_filesno sensitive capability
Show 11 more tools ↓
openai_list_vector_store_filesno sensitive capabilityopenai_list_vector_storesno sensitive capabilityopenai_retrieve_fileno sensitive capabilityopenai_retrieve_file_contentno sensitive capabilityopenai_retrieve_vector_storeno sensitive capabilityopenai_retrieve_vector_store_fileno sensitive capabilityopenai_retrieve_vector_store_file_batchno sensitive capabilityopenai_retrieve_vector_store_file_contentno sensitive capabilityopenai_search_vector_storeno sensitive capabilityopenai_update_vector_storeno sensitive capabilityopenai_update_vector_store_file_attributesno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (21 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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