Dollhousemcp — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.5.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.5.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
},
"target": {
"id": "@dollhousemcp/mcp-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@dollhousemcp/mcp-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "@dollhousemcp/mcp-server"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 80,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 13.55,
"supply-chain": 6.66,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 3.15
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.25,
"appliedPenalty": 1.58
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.1,
"appliedPenalty": 0.63
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.1,
"appliedPenalty": 0.63
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.1,
"appliedPenalty": 0.63
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.1,
"appliedPenalty": 0.63
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-006",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 3.6
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-006",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 1.8
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-006",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 0.25,
"appliedPenalty": 0.9
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-006",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 0.1,
"appliedPenalty": 0.36
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": false,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/elements/agents/Agent.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/elements/agents/Agent.js:410`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/elements/agents/Agent.js"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "dist/elements/agents/Agent.js",
"line": 410
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/elements/ensembles/Ensemble.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/elements/ensembles/Ensemble.js:1394`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/elements/ensembles/Ensemble.js"
},
"evidence": "vm.runInContext(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "dist/elements/ensembles/Ensemble.js",
"line": 1394
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/elements/agents/Agent.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/elements/agents/Agent.js:409`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/elements/agents/Agent.js"
},
"evidence": "exec(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/elements/agents/Agent.js",
"line": 409
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/handlers/GitHubAuthHandler.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/handlers/GitHubAuthHandler.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/handlers/GitHubAuthHandler.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/handlers/GitHubAuthHandler.js",
"line": 13
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/security/commandValidator.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/security/commandValidator.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/security/commandValidator.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/security/commandValidator.js",
"line": 1
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/BuildInfoService.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/services/BuildInfoService.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/services/BuildInfoService.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/services/BuildInfoService.js",
"line": 11
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/git.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/git.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/utils/git.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/utils/git.js",
"line": 4
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/web/public/app.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/web/public/app.js:618`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/web/public/app.js"
},
"evidence": "fetch(`https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DollhouseMCP/collection/main/${el.path}`",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/web/public/app.js",
"line": 618
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/web/routes.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/web/routes.js:421`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/web/routes.js"
},
"evidence": "fetch('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DollhouseMCP/collection/main/public/collection-index.json'",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/web/routes.js",
"line": 421
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"title": "Unsafe deserialization (dist/config/ConfigManager.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/config/ConfigManager.js:44`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/config/ConfigManager.js"
},
"evidence": "yaml.load(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-007",
"file": "dist/config/ConfigManager.js",
"line": 44
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"title": "Unsafe deserialization (dist/converters/AnthropicToDollhouseConverter.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/converters/AnthropicToDollhouseConverter.js:60`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/converters/AnthropicToDollhouseConverter.js"
},
"evidence": "yaml.load(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-007",
"file": "dist/converters/AnthropicToDollhouseConverter.js",
"line": 60
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"title": "Unsafe deserialization (dist/converters/DollhouseToAnthropicConverter.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/converters/DollhouseToAnthropicConverter.js:178`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/converters/DollhouseToAnthropicConverter.js"
},
"evidence": "yaml.load(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-007",
"file": "dist/converters/DollhouseToAnthropicConverter.js",
"line": 178
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"title": "Unsafe deserialization (dist/portfolio/PortfolioIndexManager.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/portfolio/PortfolioIndexManager.js:579`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/portfolio/PortfolioIndexManager.js"
},
"evidence": "yaml.load(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-007",
"file": "dist/portfolio/PortfolioIndexManager.js",
"line": 579
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"title": "Unsafe deserialization (dist/security/audit/scanners/ConfigurationScanner.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/security/audit/scanners/ConfigurationScanner.js:121`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/security/audit/scanners/ConfigurationScanner.js"
},
"evidence": "yaml.load(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-007",
"file": "dist/security/audit/scanners/ConfigurationScanner.js",
"line": 121
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"title": "Unsafe deserialization (dist/server/resources/CapabilityIndexResource.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/server/resources/CapabilityIndexResource.js:116`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/server/resources/CapabilityIndexResource.js"
},
"evidence": "yaml.load(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-007",
"file": "dist/server/resources/CapabilityIndexResource.js",
"line": 116
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"title": "Unsafe deserialization (dist/web/public/app.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/web/public/app.js:31`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/web/public/app.js"
},
"evidence": "yaml.load(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-007",
"file": "dist/web/public/app.js",
"line": 31
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-006",
"title": "Possible combosquat of mcp",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "\"@dollhousemcp/mcp-server\" is \"mcp\" with a decorative suffix — a common combosquat pattern.",
"remediation": "Confirm you meant \"mcp\". Install packages only from their documented, official name.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "@dollhousemcp/mcp-server"
},
"owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
"references": [
"https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
"https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
],
"data": {
"candidate": "@dollhousemcp/mcp-server",
"target": "mcp"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-006",
"title": "Possible combosquat of @playwright/mcp",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "\"@dollhousemcp/mcp-server\" is \"@playwright/mcp\" with a decorative suffix — a common combosquat pattern.",
"remediation": "Confirm you meant \"@playwright/mcp\". Install packages only from their documented, official name.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "@dollhousemcp/mcp-server"
},
"owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
"references": [
"https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
"https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
],
"data": {
"candidate": "@dollhousemcp/mcp-server",
"target": "@playwright/mcp"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-006",
"title": "Possible combosquat of @stripe/mcp",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "\"@dollhousemcp/mcp-server\" is \"@stripe/mcp\" with a decorative suffix — a common combosquat pattern.",
"remediation": "Confirm you meant \"@stripe/mcp\". Install packages only from their documented, official name.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "@dollhousemcp/mcp-server"
},
"owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
"references": [
"https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
"https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
],
"data": {
"candidate": "@dollhousemcp/mcp-server",
"target": "@stripe/mcp"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-006",
"title": "Possible combosquat of @browsermcp/mcp",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "\"@dollhousemcp/mcp-server\" is \"@browsermcp/mcp\" with a decorative suffix — a common combosquat pattern.",
"remediation": "Confirm you meant \"@browsermcp/mcp\". Install packages only from their documented, official name.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "@dollhousemcp/mcp-server"
},
"owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
"references": [
"https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
"https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
],
"data": {
"candidate": "@dollhousemcp/mcp-server",
"target": "@browsermcp/mcp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [],
"surfaceDigest": "34814558e9f7a878474e3e4e56000685c32ca5a6ddc66b117905cbfa48026362",
"stats": {
"tools": 0,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 7,
"medium": 13,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}