Docpull MCP Server
docpull
PyPI
v6.5.5
Published by raintree-technology — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Declare, sync, diff, and lock context dependencies for AI agents
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 11
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/docpull/context_packs/repo.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/docpull/context_packs/repo.py:399`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ry: completed = subprocess.run( # nosec B603, B607 ["git", *args], check=False,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/docpull/context_packs/repo.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/docpull/context_packs/visuals.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/docpull/context_packs/visuals.py:374`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: this call. result = subprocess.run( # nosec B603 command, check=False, capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/docpull/context_packs/visuals.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/docpull/document_parse.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/docpull/document_parse.py:386`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: hell. process = subprocess.Popen( # noqa: S603 # nosec B603 command, env=_remote_worke
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/docpull/document_parse.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/docpull/rendering.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/docpull/rendering.py:684`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: childProcess = require("child_process"); const URL = {json.dumps(url)}; const WAIT_FOR = {json.dumps(config.wait_for)};
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/docpull/rendering.py
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "fetch_url"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "fetch_url" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool fetch_url · inputSchema.properties.url
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_ci_policy.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_ci_policy.py:319`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: is not None node = subprocess.run( # nosec B603 [node_shim, "-p", "process.execPath"], check=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_ci_policy.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_claim_audit_script.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_claim_audit_script.py:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: > None: completed = subprocess.run( [ sys.executable, str(ROOT / "scripts" / "claim_
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_claim_audit_script.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_document_parse.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_document_parse.py:297`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 600 completed = subprocess.run( _remote_worker_command(request), env=_remote_worker_envi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_document_parse.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_import_efficiency.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_import_efficiency.py:25`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: aded)) """ result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-c", script], check=False, capture_out
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_import_efficiency.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_mcp_server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_mcp_server.py:31`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( ["ps", "-axo", "pid=,command="], check=False,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_mcp_server.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_real_feature_smoke_script.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_real_feature_smoke_script.py:42`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: > None: completed = subprocess.run( [ sys.executable, str(ROOT / "scripts" / "real_f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_real_feature_smoke_script.py
Tools 37
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
fetch_urlingests untrusted inputadd_sourceno sensitive capabilityaudit_packno sensitive capabilitybrand_packno sensitive capabilityensure_docsno sensitive capabilityexplain_routesno sensitive capabilityexport_packno sensitive capabilitygraph_buildno sensitive capabilitygraph_neighborsno sensitive capabilitygraph_queryno sensitive capability
Show 27 more tools ↓
graph_refreshno sensitive capabilitygraph_statusno sensitive capabilitygrep_docsno sensitive capabilityimage_packno sensitive capabilityintelligence_bundleno sensitive capabilitylist_indexedno sensitive capabilitylist_sourcesno sensitive capabilitypack_briefno sensitive capabilitypack_citationsno sensitive capabilitypack_diffno sensitive capabilitypack_entitiesno sensitive capabilitypack_prepareno sensitive capabilitypack_scoreno sensitive capabilitypack_searchno sensitive capabilitypolicy_packno sensitive capabilityproduct_packno sensitive capabilityread_docno sensitive capabilityrefresh_packno sensitive capabilityrelationship_packno sensitive capabilityremove_sourceno sensitive capabilityrender_urlno sensitive capabilityscreenshot_packno sensitive capabilityserve_pack_statusno sensitive capabilitystyleguide_packno sensitive capabilityvalidate_policyno sensitive capabilitywebsite_packno sensitive capabilityworkflow_runno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (37 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v6.5.5 latest |
A 93/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
v6.5.0 |
A 93/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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