Dockerpilot MCP Server
dockerpilot-mcp
npm
v0.0.13
Source verified
Published by gleisonoliveira — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Tool "exec_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "exec_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool exec_command
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([container_logs]) co-exist with external-action tools ([exec_command]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [container_logs] → sinks [exec_command]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow container_logs → exec_command
low Mutating tool "exec_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "exec_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool exec_command
Tools 16
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
container_logsingests untrusted inputexec_commandruns code / shellcreate_containerno sensitive capabilitycreate_volumeno sensitive capabilitydelete_containerno sensitive capabilitydelete_imageno sensitive capabilitydelete_volumeno sensitive capabilitydocker_statusno sensitive capabilitylist_containersno sensitive capabilitylist_imagesno sensitive capability
Show 6 more tools ↓
list_volumesno sensitive capabilityprune_imagesno sensitive capabilitypull_imageno sensitive capabilityrestart_containerno sensitive capabilitystart_containersno sensitive capabilitystop_containersno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (16 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.0.13 latest |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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