Docker — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "docker-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "docker-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "docker-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 96,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "moderate",
"label": "capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "moderate",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (8 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/utils/config-loader.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/config-loader.js:120`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/utils/config-loader.js"
},
"evidence": "_MCP_PRIVATE_KEY=~/.ssh/id_rsa `); } /** * Prints current configuration */ export function printCurrentConfig(config)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/utils/config-loader.js",
"line": 120,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "docker_container_inspect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "docker_container_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "docker_container_logs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "docker_container_restart",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "docker_container_start",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "docker_container_stop",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "docker_system_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "docker_system_version",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "51d1628bfcfdd84bd630025e30ca106aa8eb59d9e96fcbc58f6f49f6e51cabd6",
"stats": {
"tools": 8,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 0,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}