Doc77 MCP Server
@doc77/mcp
npm
v1.1.10
Published by @doc77 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Doc77 MCP — MCP protocol implementation, security guard, operation queue, transactions
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "list_files"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "list_files" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool list_files · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "file_path" on "read_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "read_file" takes a path parameter "file_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool read_file · inputSchema.properties.file_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "file_paths" on "read_files"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "read_files" takes a path parameter "file_paths" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool read_files · inputSchema.properties.file_paths
Tools 10
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
list_filesreads sensitive dataread_filereads sensitive dataread_filesreads sensitive dataconfigure_agentno sensitive capabilitydiff_filesno sensitive capabilityget_file_infono sensitive capabilityget_project_infono sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilitysearch_filesno sensitive capabilitysession_authorizeno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (10 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.10 latest |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.1.9 |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-19 |
v1.1.8 |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-18 |
v1.1.6 |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
v1.1.3 |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-15 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v1.1.1 |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
v1.1.0 |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
v1.0.8 |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-09 |
v1.0.6 |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
v1.0.4 |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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