Doc Index MCP Server

doc-index-mcp PyPI v0.2.0

Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.

MCP server for semantic document search with boundary-aware chunking

View on PyPI ↗ Raw report (JSON) ↗

Trust grade

98/100

Last scanned 2026-08-25 get badge →

Trust

A · 98/100

Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.

Capability

Minimal

Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.

Coverage

Source

How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.

A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 98/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 2 = 98. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

Points	Adoption-risk factor
−2	publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/smoke_stdio.py)MTC-SRC-002

In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/smoke_stdio.py:51`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: sys.argv[1] proc = subprocess.Popen( [server_path], stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subproces

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server scripts/smoke_stdio.py

Tools 8

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

doc_chunkno sensitive capability
doc_get_contentno sensitive capability
doc_indexno sensitive capability
doc_listno sensitive capability
doc_tocno sensitive capability
extract_tableno sensitive capability
list_tablesno sensitive capability
read_documentno sensitive capability

What this scan could not see

Tools were statically extracted from the published source (8 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".

Versions 2

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

Version	Score	Findings	Engine	Scanned
`v0.2.0` latest	A 98/100	1	1.13.0	2026-08-25
`v0.1.0`	A 98/100	0	1.12.1	2026-07-27

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

Markdown (GitHub README)

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HTML

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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan doc-index-mcp --online --registry pypi

Use the free API → How scoring works

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