React Native Expo (divagnz) MCP Server
@divagnz/mcp-react-native-expo
npm
v0.0.1
Source verified
Published by divagnz — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
React Native Expo MCP server - forked and expanded with expert code remediation, advanced refactoring, modular architecture, and comprehensive testing. Professional development companion for React Native teams with upcoming Expo, ADB, and iOS tool integra
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Dynamic code execution in server code (build/tools/modules/analysis/component-analyzer.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`build/tools/modules/analysis/component-analyzer.js:174`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ggestions.push('Replace eval() with safer alternatives like JSON.parse()'); } // Network security
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/modules/analysis/component-analyzer.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/tools/expo/core/expo-executor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/tools/expo/core/expo-executor.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { logger } from '../../../utils/logger.js'; import { EXPO_CLI, EXPO_COMMA
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/expo/core/expo-executor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/tools/expo/core/shell-session-manager.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/tools/expo/core/shell-session-manager.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { EventEmitter } from 'events'; import { logger } from '../../../utils/lo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/expo/core/shell-session-manager.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/tools/modules/services/package-management-service.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/tools/modules/services/package-management-service.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { VersionUtils } from '../utils/version
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/modules/services/package-management-service.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/tools/modules/services/test-coverage-service.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/tools/modules/services/test-coverage-service.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import * as fs from 'fs'; import * as path from 'path'; export class TestCoverag
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/modules/services/test-coverage-service.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (build/tools/modules/services/version-management-service.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`build/tools/modules/services/version-management-service.js:74`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://api.github.com/repos/MrNitro360/React-Native-MCP/releases/latest'); i
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/modules/services/version-management-service.js
Tools 33
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
expo_build_local_readreads sensitive dataexpo_dev_readreads sensitive dataanalyze_codebase_comprehensiveno sensitive capabilityanalyze_codebase_performanceno sensitive capabilityanalyze_componentno sensitive capabilityanalyze_test_coverageno sensitive capabilityanalyze_testing_strategyno sensitive capabilityarchitecture_adviceno sensitive capabilityaudit_packagesno sensitive capabilitycheck_for_updatesno sensitive capability
Show 23 more tools ↓
debug_issueno sensitive capabilityeas_buildno sensitive capabilityeas_build_statusno sensitive capabilityeas_submitno sensitive capabilityeas_updateno sensitive capabilityeas_update_statusno sensitive capabilityexpo_build_local_startno sensitive capabilityexpo_build_local_stopno sensitive capabilityexpo_create_appno sensitive capabilityexpo_dev_sendno sensitive capabilityexpo_dev_startno sensitive capabilityexpo_dev_stopno sensitive capabilityexpo_doctorno sensitive capabilityexpo_installno sensitive capabilityexpo_upgradeno sensitive capabilitygenerate_component_testno sensitive capabilityget_version_infono sensitive capabilitymigrate_packagesno sensitive capabilityoptimize_performanceno sensitive capabilityrefactor_componentno sensitive capabilityremediate_codeno sensitive capabilityresolve_dependenciesno sensitive capabilityupgrade_packagesno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (33 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.0.1 latest |
A 94/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @divagnz/mcp-react-native-expo --onlineOther implementations of React Native Expo 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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