Distillery — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "distillery-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "distillery-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "distillery-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 92,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (17 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/distillery/eval/longmemeval.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/distillery/eval/longmemeval.py:170`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/distillery/eval/longmemeval.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"rev-parse\", \"HEAD\"], capture_output=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/distillery/eval/longmemeval.py",
"line": 170,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_feeds_reader.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_feeds_reader.py:143`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_feeds_reader.py"
},
"evidence": "result = await client.fetch(\"https://example.com/post\") assert result == body assert len(transport.cal",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "tests/test_feeds_reader.py",
"line": 143,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/hooks/session_start_briefing.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/hooks/session_start_briefing.py:600`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/hooks/session_start_briefing.py"
},
"evidence": "try: proc = subprocess.Popen( command, stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=sub",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/hooks/session_start_briefing.py",
"line": 600,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/promptfoo_provider.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/promptfoo_provider.py:80`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/promptfoo_provider.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [ \"claude\", \"--output-format\",",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/promptfoo_provider.py",
"line": 80,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_cli.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_cli.py:505`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_cli.py"
},
"evidence": "d\\n\") result = subprocess.run( [distillery_bin, \"--config\", str(bad), \"status\"], captur",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_cli.py",
"line": 505,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_duckdb_store.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_duckdb_store.py:1167`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_duckdb_store.py"
},
"evidence": "\"\") proc = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, \"-c\", writer], env=env,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_duckdb_store.py",
"line": 1167,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_store_wal_durability.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_store_wal_durability.py:112`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_store_wal_durability.py"
},
"evidence": "\"\"\" ) result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, \"-c\", script], capture_output=True, tim",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_store_wal_durability.py",
"line": 112,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"distillery-mcp\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "distillery-mcp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "distillery_store",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "distillery_store_batch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "distillery_ingest_doc",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "distillery_get",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"browse\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "distillery_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "distillery_correct",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "distillery_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "distillery_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "distillery_find_similar",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "distillery_classify",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "distillery_resolve_review",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "distillery_watch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "distillery_relations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "distillery_gh_sync",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "distillery_sync_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "distillery_configure",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "distillery_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "6c5aa9e04d575767a9b54b062418bb1138fd73d3214fb17c501beb7fc31122b9",
"stats": {
"tools": 17,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 0,
"low": 6,
"info": 1
}
}
}