Discord Mcp Plus MCP Server

discord-mcp-plus npm v1.0.1

Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.

Trust grade
A
95/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 95/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Moderate
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 95/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 5 = 95. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−3 capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−2 publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 3

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([get_messages, get_thread_messages, get_dm_history, read_forum_post, get_attachment_content]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_message, send_message_with_attachment, create_webhook, delete_webhook, send_webhook_message]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [get_messages, get_thread_messages, get_dm_history, read_forum_post, get_attachment_content] → sinks [send_message, send_message_with_attachment, crea

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow get_messages → send_message

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "send_message_with_attachment"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "send_message_with_attachment" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool send_message_with_attachment · inputSchema.properties.url

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "get_attachment_content"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "get_attachment_content" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool get_attachment_content · inputSchema.properties.url

Tools 43

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • create_webhooknetwork egress
  • delete_webhooknetwork egress
  • get_attachment_contentingests untrusted input
  • get_dm_historyingests untrusted input
  • get_messagesingests untrusted input
  • get_thread_messagesingests untrusted input
  • read_forum_postingests untrusted input
  • send_messagenetwork egress
  • send_message_with_attachmentnetwork egress
  • send_webhook_messagenetwork egress
Show 33 more tools ↓
  • add_reactionno sensitive capability
  • add_roleno sensitive capability
  • add_thread_memberno sensitive capability
  • archive_threadno sensitive capability
  • ban_memberno sensitive capability
  • create_channelno sensitive capability
  • create_forum_postno sensitive capability
  • create_threadno sensitive capability
  • delete_channelno sensitive capability
  • delete_messageno sensitive capability
  • edit_messageno sensitive capability
  • get_channelno sensitive capability
  • get_guildno sensitive capability
  • get_memberno sensitive capability
  • get_reactionsno sensitive capability
  • get_server_infono sensitive capability
  • kick_memberno sensitive capability
  • list_bot_permissionsno sensitive capability
  • list_channelsno sensitive capability
  • list_forum_postsno sensitive capability
  • list_guildsno sensitive capability
  • list_membersno sensitive capability
  • list_rolesno sensitive capability
  • list_threadsno sensitive capability
  • list_webhooksno sensitive capability
  • remove_all_reactionsno sensitive capability
  • remove_reactionno sensitive capability
  • remove_roleno sensitive capability
  • remove_thread_memberno sensitive capability
  • remove_user_reactionno sensitive capability
  • search_messagesno sensitive capability
  • send_dmno sensitive capability
  • wait_for_messageno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.0.1 latest A 95/100 3 1.9.0 2026-07-23

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 95/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan discord-mcp-plus --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

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