Discord Forum (ChangwooJ) MCP Server
discord-forum-mcp
npm
v2.0.0
Source verified
Published by changwooj — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Discord 포럼 채널 워크플로우를 위한 경량 MCP 서버
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 3 = 97. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([read_messages]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_message]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [read_messages] → sinks [send_message]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow read_messages → send_message
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (build/tools/create-forum-post.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`build/tools/create-forum-post.js:108`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch(`https://discord.com/api/v10/channels/${channelId}/threads`, { method: "POST",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/create-forum-post.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (build/tools/send-message.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`build/tools/send-message.js:30`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch(`https://discord.com/api/v10/channels/${channelId}/messages`, { method: "POST"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/send-message.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (build/tools/update-forum-post.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`build/tools/update-forum-post.js:40`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch(`https://discord.com/api/v10/channels/${threadId}`, { method: "PATCH",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/update-forum-post.js
Tools 6
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
read_messagesingests untrusted inputsend_messagenetwork egresscreate_forum_postno sensitive capabilityget_forum_tagsno sensitive capabilitylist_forum_threadsno sensitive capabilityupdate_forum_postno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (6 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.0.0 latest |
A 97/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.1.2 |
A 95/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan discord-forum-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Discord Forum 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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