Dicom (hengqujushi) MCP Server

dicom-mcp npm v1.2.7

Published by hengqujushi — no publish provenance and no vendor-owned scope, so the publisher could not be verified. The repository link below is self-declared.

Trust grade
B
87/100
Last scanned
Trust
B · 87/100
How safe the published surface and source look. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
B Why this grade 100 − 12.6 = 87/100

Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−6.3 Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 injection
−6.3 Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 supply-chain

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.

Findings 6

high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/dicom-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`bin/dicom-mcp.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: child_process

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server bin/dicom-mcp.js

high Shell/command execution in server code (dicom_download/multi_download.py)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dicom_download/multi_download.py:344`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: subprocess.run(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dicom_download/multi_download.py

high Shell/command execution in server code (scripts/postinstall.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`scripts/postinstall.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: child_process

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server scripts/postinstall.js

high Shell/command execution in server code (scripts/validate.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`scripts/validate.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: child_process

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server scripts/validate.js

medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (bin/dicom-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-009

In the server's implementation (`bin/dicom-mcp.js:43`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: execSync(`${

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server bin/dicom-mcp.js

medium Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010

"dicom-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. The large majority of malicious packages abuse install hooks to run code before you ever import them.

Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.

Location: package dicom-mcp

What this scan could not see

Versions

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.2.7 latest B 87/100 6 1.5.0 2026-07-22

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MCP Trust Score: B · 87/100
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npx mcptrustchecker scan dicom-mcp --online

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