Google Workspace (dguido) MCP Server
@dguido/google-workspace-mcp
npm
v3.4.4
Source verified
Published by dguido — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Google Workspace MCP Server - Model Context Protocol server providing secure access to Google Drive, Docs, Sheets, Slides, Calendar, and Gmail through MCP clients e.g. Claude Desktop
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: download_attachment → list_trash ⇒ send_email. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink — and at least one leg is a direct schema wire (⇒), where a producer's output drops straight into a free-text parameter of the next tool, so the chain needs little agent cooperation. Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow download_attachment → list_trash → send_email
medium Tool "create_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "create_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "create_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool create_file
low Mutating tool "create_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "create_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool create_file
Tools 102
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_filewrites filesdownload_attachmentingests untrusted inputdownload_fileingests untrusted inputlist_trashreads sensitive dataread_emailingests untrusted inputsend_emailnetwork egressupload_filenetwork egressactionno sensitive capabilityadd_google_sheet_conditional_formatno sensitive capabilityappend_to_docno sensitive capability
Show 92 more tools ↓
backup-folderno sensitive capabilitybatch_deleteno sensitive capabilitybatch_moveno sensitive capabilitybatch_restoreno sensitive capabilitybatch_shareno sensitive capabilitycleanup-old-filesno sensitive capabilitycopy_fileno sensitive capabilitycreate_contactno sensitive capabilitycreate_eventno sensitive capabilitycreate_filterno sensitive capabilitycreate_folderno sensitive capabilitycreate_google_docno sensitive capabilitycreate_google_sheetno sensitive capabilitycreate_google_slidesno sensitive capabilitycreate_google_slides_shapeno sensitive capabilitycreate_google_slides_text_boxno sensitive capabilitycreate_text_fileno sensitive capabilitydaysOldno sensitive capabilitydelete_contactno sensitive capabilitydelete_draftno sensitive capabilitydelete_emailno sensitive capabilitydelete_eventno sensitive capabilitydelete_filterno sensitive capabilitydelete_itemno sensitive capabilitydelete_labelno sensitive capabilitydelete_text_in_docno sensitive capabilitydraft_emailno sensitive capabilityemailsno sensitive capabilityempty_trashno sensitive capabilityexport_fileno sensitive capabilityfileIdsno sensitive capabilityfileTypesno sensitive capabilityfind_free_timeno sensitive capabilityfolderIdno sensitive capabilityformat_google_doc_rangeno sensitive capabilityformat_google_sheet_cellsno sensitive capabilityformat_slide_backgroundno sensitive capabilityformat_slides_shapeno sensitive capabilityformat_slides_textno sensitive capabilityget_contactno sensitive capabilityget_eventno sensitive capabilityget_file_contentno sensitive capabilityget_file_metadatano sensitive capabilityget_folder_treeno sensitive capabilityget_google_doc_contentno sensitive capabilityget_google_sheet_contentno sensitive capabilityget_google_slides_contentno sensitive capabilityget_or_create_labelno sensitive capabilityget_sharingno sensitive capabilityget_statusno sensitive capabilityget_storage_quotano sensitive capabilityinsert_text_in_docno sensitive capabilitylist_calendarsno sensitive capabilitylist_contactsno sensitive capabilitylist_draftsno sensitive capabilitylist_eventsno sensitive capabilitylist_filtersno sensitive capabilitylist_folderno sensitive capabilitylist_labelsno sensitive capabilitylist_revisionsno sensitive capabilitylist_slide_pagesno sensitive capabilitylist_toolsno sensitive capabilitylocalPathno sensitive capabilitymerge_google_sheet_cellsno sensitive capabilitymigrate-formatno sensitive capabilitymodify_emailno sensitive capabilitymove_itemno sensitive capabilityorganize-folderno sensitive capabilityorganizeByno sensitive capabilityremove_permissionno sensitive capabilityrename_itemno sensitive capabilityreplace_text_in_docno sensitive capabilityresolve_file_pathno sensitive capabilityrestore_from_trashno sensitive capabilityrestore_revisionno sensitive capabilityroleno sensitive capabilitysearchno sensitive capabilitysearch_contactsno sensitive capabilitysearch_emailsno sensitive capabilityshare_fileno sensitive capabilityshare-with-teamno sensitive capabilitysheet_tabsno sensitive capabilityslides_speaker_notesno sensitive capabilitystar_fileno sensitive capabilityupdate_contactno sensitive capabilityupdate_eventno sensitive capabilityupdate_fileno sensitive capabilityupdate_google_docno sensitive capabilityupdate_google_sheetno sensitive capabilityupdate_google_slidesno sensitive capabilityupdate_labelno sensitive capabilityupdate_text_fileno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (102 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.4.4 latest |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @dguido/google-workspace-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Google Workspace 13
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