Devnarrate MCP Server
devnarrate
PyPI
v0.1.0a7
Published by kmandana — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for developer workflow automation — smart commits, secret scanning, PR descriptions, and more.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Hardcoded PEM private key in test/example/packaging MTC-SRC-008 | exfiltration |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Shell/command execution in server code (devnarrate/git_operations.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`devnarrate/git_operations.py:59`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ls """ result = subprocess.run( ['git', 'diff', '--staged'], cwd=repo_path, capture_outp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server devnarrate/git_operations.py
low Hardcoded PEM private key in test/example/packaging (tests/sample_diffs.py)MTC-SRC-008
A hardcoded PEM private key (a live-looking credential hardcoded in shipped code) appears in `tests/sample_diffs.py:114`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.
Evidence: PEM private key: ----…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server tests/sample_diffs.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/conftest.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/conftest.py:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: repo root. """ subprocess.run( ["git", "init"], cwd=tmp_path, capture_output=True, check=True )
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/conftest.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_config.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_config.py:251`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: text("x = 1\n") subprocess.run( ["git", "add", "app.py"], cwd=tmp_git_repo, capture_outp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_config.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_git_operations.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_git_operations.py:135`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nt("hello")\n') subprocess.run( ["git", "add", "new_file.py"], cwd=tmp_git_repo, capture
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_git_operations.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_secret_scanner.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_secret_scanner.py:256`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: NN7EXAMPLE"\n') subprocess.run( ["git", "add", "config.py"], cwd=tmp_git_repo, capture_o
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_secret_scanner.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_server.py:57`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nt("hello")\n') subprocess.run( ["git", "add", "hello.py"], cwd=tmp_git_repo, capture_ou
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_server.py
Tools 6
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
commit_changesno sensitive capabilitycreate_prno sensitive capabilityexecute_split_commitno sensitive capabilityget_commit_contextno sensitive capabilityget_pr_contextno sensitive capabilityreview_changesno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (6 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.0a7 latest |
A 92/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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