Devkit (npm) MCP Server

devkit-mcp npm v1.1.0

Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.

Trust grade
A
95/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 95/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Moderate
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 95/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 5 = 95. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−3 capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−2 publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([http_fetch]) co-exist with external-action tools ([http_fetch]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [http_fetch] → sinks [http_fetch]

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow http_fetch → http_fetch

Tools 37

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • http_fetchingests untrusted inputnetwork egress
  • color_hex_to_hslno sensitive capability
  • color_hex_to_rgbno sensitive capability
  • color_hsl_to_hexno sensitive capability
  • color_mixno sensitive capability
  • color_rgb_to_hexno sensitive capability
  • decode_htmlno sensitive capability
  • decode_unicodeno sensitive capability
  • decode_urlno sensitive capability
  • diff_textno sensitive capability
Show 27 more tools ↓
  • encode_htmlno sensitive capability
  • encode_unicodeno sensitive capability
  • encode_urlno sensitive capability
  • format_json_to_tomlno sensitive capability
  • format_json_to_yamlno sensitive capability
  • format_minify_jsonno sensitive capability
  • format_pretty_jsonno sensitive capability
  • format_toml_to_jsonno sensitive capability
  • format_yaml_to_jsonno sensitive capability
  • hash_base64no sensitive capability
  • hash_file_checksumno sensitive capability
  • hash_hmacno sensitive capability
  • hash_md5no sensitive capability
  • hash_sha1no sensitive capability
  • hash_sha256no sensitive capability
  • hash_sha512no sensitive capability
  • json_schemano sensitive capability
  • pwd_genno sensitive capability
  • regex_extractno sensitive capability
  • regex_replaceno sensitive capability
  • regex_testno sensitive capability
  • time_date_to_timestampno sensitive capability
  • time_durationno sensitive capability
  • time_nowno sensitive capability
  • time_timestamp_to_dateno sensitive capability
  • uuid_bulkno sensitive capability
  • uuid_genno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.1.0 latest A 95/100 1 1.10.0 2026-07-25

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 95/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan devkit-mcp --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

Other implementations of Devkit 2

Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 3 side by side →

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