Developer Tools MCP Server
developer-tools-mcp
npm
v1.0.63
Published by d4n5h — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
A MCP server that provides tools for development using puppeteer and other tools
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Tool "run-script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "run-script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "run_script" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool run-script
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([get-page-errors, get-page-title, get-page-url, get-page-content]) co-exist with external-action tools ([run-script, upload-file, perform-api-request]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [get-page-errors, get-page-title, get-page-url, get-page-content] → sinks [run-script, upload-file, perform-api-request]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow get-page-errors → run-script
low Mutating tool "run-script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "run-script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool run-script
Tools 63
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get-page-contentingests untrusted inputget-page-errorsingests untrusted inputget-page-titleingests untrusted inputget-page-urlingests untrusted inputperform-api-requestnetwork egressrun-scriptruns code / shellupload-filenetwork egressanalyze-accessibilityno sensitive capabilityanalyze-code-coverageno sensitive capabilityanalyze-performanceno sensitive capability
Show 53 more tools ↓
analyze-seono sensitive capabilitycheck-if-dialog-is-openno sensitive capabilitycheck-security-headersno sensitive capabilityclick-elementno sensitive capabilityclose-pageno sensitive capabilitycreate-pageno sensitive capabilityemulate-deviceno sensitive capabilitygenerate-pdfno sensitive capabilityget-all-clickable-elementsno sensitive capabilityget-all-cookiesno sensitive capabilityget-child-elementsno sensitive capabilityget-computed-styleno sensitive capabilityget-console-logsno sensitive capabilityget-cookie-by-nameno sensitive capabilityget-cookies-by-domainno sensitive capabilityget-element-attributeno sensitive capabilityget-element-countno sensitive capabilityget-element-htmlno sensitive capabilityget-element-positionno sensitive capabilityget-element-propertyno sensitive capabilityget-element-styleno sensitive capabilityget-element-textno sensitive capabilityget-element-valueno sensitive capabilityget-element-visibilityno sensitive capabilityget-full-page-screenshotno sensitive capabilityget-local-timeno sensitive capabilityget-network-requestsno sensitive capabilityget-parent-elementno sensitive capabilityget-resource-usageno sensitive capabilityget-screenshotno sensitive capabilityget-utc-timeno sensitive capabilityhandle-dialogno sensitive capabilityhover-elementno sensitive capabilitylist-pagesno sensitive capabilitynavigate-to-urlno sensitive capabilitypress-keyno sensitive capabilitypress-keysno sensitive capabilityrefresh-pageno sensitive capabilityscroll-to-bottomno sensitive capabilityscroll-to-elementno sensitive capabilityscroll-to-positionno sensitive capabilityscroll-to-topno sensitive capabilityset-cookieno sensitive capabilityssh-connectno sensitive capabilityssh-disconnectno sensitive capabilityssh-executeno sensitive capabilityssh-list-connectionsno sensitive capabilitysubmit-formno sensitive capabilityswitch-pageno sensitive capabilityswitch-to-frameno sensitive capabilitytype-text-in-elementno sensitive capabilitywait-for-elementno sensitive capabilitywait-for-page-loadno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (63 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.63 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan developer-tools-mcp --onlineMore in Other
A Model Context Protocol server implementation for AdGuard Home that enables AI agents to query and manage DNS records, filtering rules and more
Identity oracle and trust layer for autonomous AI agents. Bidirectional KYA and trust scoring.
MCP server with Airtable integration
A free one-minute reset for people, delivered by AI, with no account or personal data.
Access SEC filings efficiently, save time and tokens, and get cited answers.
A smart [MCP](https://modelcontextprotocol.io) server for [AniList](https://anilist.co) that gets your anime/manga taste - not just API calls.