Smallest MCP Server
@developer-smallestai/smallest-mcp-server
npm
v0.11.2
Published by @developer-smallestai — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for the Smallest AI platform — manage agents, debug calls, view analytics from your IDE
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([list_calls, get_webhooks]) co-exist with external-action tools ([add_agent_tool, update_agent, create_webhook, update_webhook, delete_webhook, attach_agent_webhook, detach_agent_webhooks]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [list_calls, get_webhooks] → sinks [add_agent_tool, update_agent, create_webhook, update_webhook, delete_webhook, attach_agent_webhook, detach_agent_w
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow list_calls → add_agent_tool
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "add_agent_tool"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "add_agent_tool" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool add_agent_tool · inputSchema.properties.url
Tools 83
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
add_agent_toolnetwork egressattach_agent_webhooknetwork egresscreate_webhooknetwork egressdelete_webhooknetwork egressdetach_agent_webhooksnetwork egressget_webhooksingests untrusted inputlist_callsingests untrusted inputupdate_agentnetwork egressupdate_webhooknetwork egressadd_audience_membersno sensitive capability
Show 73 more tools ↓
add_playbooksno sensitive capabilitychat_with_agentno sensitive capabilityconfigure_call_actionsno sensitive capabilityconfigure_playbooksno sensitive capabilitycreate_agentno sensitive capabilitycreate_branchno sensitive capabilitycreate_campaignno sensitive capabilitydebug_callno sensitive capabilitydelete_agentno sensitive capabilitydelete_audienceno sensitive capabilitydelete_audience_membersno sensitive capabilitydelete_branchno sensitive capabilitydelete_campaignno sensitive capabilitydiffno sensitive capabilityduplicate_agentno sensitive capabilityexport_campaign_logsno sensitive capabilityget_agentno sensitive capabilityget_agent_performanceno sensitive capabilityget_agent_promptno sensitive capabilityget_agent_webhooksno sensitive capabilityget_agentsno sensitive capabilityget_attempt_cohortsno sensitive capabilityget_audienceno sensitive capabilityget_audience_membersno sensitive capabilityget_audiencesno sensitive capabilityget_auto_reloadno sensitive capabilityget_billing_alertsno sensitive capabilityget_branch_draftno sensitive capabilityget_call_counts_by_dayno sensitive capabilityget_call_outcomesno sensitive capabilityget_call_start_distributionno sensitive capabilityget_call_volumeno sensitive capabilityget_campaignno sensitive capabilityget_campaignsno sensitive capabilityget_concurrencyno sensitive capabilityget_credit_balanceno sensitive capabilityget_credit_ledgerno sensitive capabilityget_credit_usageno sensitive capabilityget_daily_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_dashboardno sensitive capabilityget_duration_statsno sensitive capabilityget_hourly_performanceno sensitive capabilityget_invoicesno sensitive capabilityget_payment_methodsno sensitive capabilityget_phone_number_trendsno sensitive capabilityget_phone_numbersno sensitive capabilityget_pickup_ratesno sensitive capabilityget_plansno sensitive capabilityget_playbooksno sensitive capabilityget_revisionno sensitive capabilityget_usage_breakdownno sensitive capabilityget_usage_statsno sensitive capabilityget_voicesno sensitive capabilityget_webhook_eventsno sensitive capabilityget_weekly_trendsno sensitive capabilityinvite_memberno sensitive capabilitylist_branchesno sensitive capabilitylist_revisionsno sensitive capabilitymake_branch_liveno sensitive capabilitymake_callno sensitive capabilitypause_campaignno sensitive capabilitypublish_draftno sensitive capabilityredeem_couponno sensitive capabilityremove_agent_toolno sensitive capabilityrename_branchno sensitive capabilitysearch_audience_membersno sensitive capabilitystart_campaignno sensitive capabilitytest_agentno sensitive capabilitytext_to_speechno sensitive capabilitytranscribe_audiono sensitive capabilityupdate_billing_alertsno sensitive capabilityupdate_playbookno sensitive capabilityvalidate_couponno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (83 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 5
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.11.2 latest |
A 96/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
v0.11.1 |
A 96/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-06 |
v0.10.0 |
A 96/100 | 2 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
v0.9.5 |
A 96/100 | 2 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
v0.9.4 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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