Github (devassistantai) MCP Server

@devassistantai/github npm v1.0.0

Published by @devassistantai — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

MCP server for GitHub

Trust grade
A
93/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 93/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
Share this Trust Score
𝕏 Share LinkedIn Reddit
A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 93/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004

Tools that read sensitive data ([get_file_contents]) and tools that can send data out ([create_issue, create_pull_request, create_pull_request_review]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.

Evidence: sources [get_file_contents] → sinks [create_issue, create_pull_request, create_pull_request_review]

Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.

Location: flow get_file_contents → create_issue

Tools 33

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • create_issuenetwork egress
  • create_pull_requestnetwork egress
  • create_pull_request_reviewnetwork egress
  • get_file_contentsreads sensitive data
  • add_issue_commentno sensitive capability
  • add_pull_request_commentno sensitive capability
  • add_pull_request_issue_commentno sensitive capability
  • create_branchno sensitive capability
  • create_or_update_fileno sensitive capability
  • create_repositoryno sensitive capability
Show 23 more tools ↓
  • fork_repositoryno sensitive capability
  • get_issueno sensitive capability
  • get_pull_requestno sensitive capability
  • get_pull_request_commentsno sensitive capability
  • get_pull_request_filesno sensitive capability
  • get_pull_request_reviewsno sensitive capability
  • get_pull_request_statusno sensitive capability
  • list_commitsno sensitive capability
  • list_issuesno sensitive capability
  • list_pull_requestsno sensitive capability
  • merge_pull_requestno sensitive capability
  • push_filesno sensitive capability
  • reply_to_pull_request_commentno sensitive capability
  • resolve_pull_request_conversationno sensitive capability
  • search_codeno sensitive capability
  • search_issuesno sensitive capability
  • search_repositoriesno sensitive capability
  • search_usersno sensitive capability
  • test_connectionno sensitive capability
  • update_issueno sensitive capability
  • update_pull_requestno sensitive capability
  • update_pull_request_branchno sensitive capability
  • update_pull_request_commentno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.0.0 latest A 93/100 1 1.13.0 2026-09-07

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 93/100
Markdown (GitHub README)
[![MCP Trust Score](https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/devassistantai-github/badge.svg)](https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/devassistantai-github)
HTML
<a href="https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/devassistantai-github"><img src="https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/devassistantai-github/badge.svg" alt="MCP Trust Score" height="20"></a>
Prefer shields.io styling? Point it at https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/devassistantai-github/badge.json via https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=…

Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan @devassistantai/github --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

Other implementations of Github 27

Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 28 side by side →

More in Developer Tools