Depsonar MCP Server
depsonar
npm
v4.0.0
Published by soflution1 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for dependency auditing, live CVE scanning, migration detection & full stack health. 23 tools, 9 languages.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 9.5 = 91. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −9.5 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×2 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 91 − 11 = 80. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/audit.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/audit.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { existsSync } from "fs"; import { join } from "path"; function cmd(comma
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/audit.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/changelog.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/changelog.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { existsSync } from "fs"; import { join } from "path"; function getUpdate
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/changelog.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/deprecated.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/deprecated.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "fs"; import { join } from "path"; // K
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/deprecated.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/project.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/project.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { existsSync, readFileSync, readdirSync, writeFileSync, statSync } from "
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/project.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/runtimes.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/runtimes.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "fs"; import { join } from "path"; func
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/runtimes.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/toolchain.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/toolchain.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; function cmd(command) { try { return execSync(command, {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/toolchain.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/services/osv.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/osv.js:99`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const resp = await fetch("https://api.osv.dev/v1/querybatch", { method: "POST", hea
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/osv.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/services/audit.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/audit.js:24`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: me) { try { execSync(`which ${name}`, { stdio: "pipe" }); return true; } catch { ret
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/audit.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/services/project.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/project.js:65`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: md) { try { execSync(`which ${cmd}`, { encoding: "utf-8", stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "pipe"] }); return
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/project.js
Tools 25
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
depsonar_docsingests untrusted inputdepsonar_actionsno sensitive capabilitydepsonar_alertsno sensitive capabilitydepsonar_auditno sensitive capabilitydepsonar_changelogno sensitive capabilitydepsonar_checkno sensitive capabilitydepsonar_configno sensitive capabilitydepsonar_cveno sensitive capabilitydepsonar_deprecatedno sensitive capabilitydepsonar_dockerno sensitive capability
Show 15 more tools ↓
depsonar_envcheckno sensitive capabilitydepsonar_healthno sensitive capabilitydepsonar_infrano sensitive capabilitydepsonar_installno sensitive capabilitydepsonar_licensesno sensitive capabilitydepsonar_live_cveno sensitive capabilitydepsonar_migrateno sensitive capabilitydepsonar_runtimesno sensitive capabilitydepsonar_scanno sensitive capabilitydepsonar_search_packageno sensitive capabilitydepsonar_secretsno sensitive capabilitydepsonar_setup_checkerno sensitive capabilitydepsonar_toolchainno sensitive capabilitydepsonar_updateno sensitive capabilitydepsonar_update_allno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (25 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v4.0.0 latest |
B 80/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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