Raw scan report

Delegator — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.9.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.

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{
  "tool": {
    "name": "mcptrustchecker",
    "version": "1.9.0",
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
  },
  "target": {
    "id": "delegator-mcp",
    "source": {
      "kind": "package",
      "origin": "delegator-mcp"
    },
    "server": {
      "name": "delegator-mcp"
    }
  },
  "grade": "B",
  "score": {
    "score": 82,
    "threatScore": 89,
    "grade": "B",
    "band": "B",
    "categorySubtotals": {
      "injection": 11.03,
      "exfiltration": 0,
      "permissions": 0,
      "supply-chain": 0,
      "network": 0,
      "hygiene": 0
    },
    "vector": [
      {
        "kind": "threat",
        "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
        "category": "injection",
        "severity": "medium",
        "confidence": "strong",
        "rawWeight": 9,
        "confidenceMult": 0.7,
        "diminishingFactor": 1,
        "appliedPenalty": 6.3
      },
      {
        "kind": "threat",
        "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
        "category": "injection",
        "severity": "medium",
        "confidence": "strong",
        "rawWeight": 9,
        "confidenceMult": 0.7,
        "diminishingFactor": 0.5,
        "appliedPenalty": 3.15
      },
      {
        "kind": "threat",
        "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
        "category": "injection",
        "severity": "medium",
        "confidence": "strong",
        "rawWeight": 9,
        "confidenceMult": 0.7,
        "diminishingFactor": 0.25,
        "appliedPenalty": 1.58
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "capability-exposure",
        "level": "high",
        "label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
        "appliedPenalty": 6
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "verification-discount",
        "level": "repo",
        "label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
        "appliedPenalty": 1
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "coverage-honesty",
        "level": "source",
        "label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
        "appliedPenalty": 0
      }
    ],
    "gatesFired": [],
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
  },
  "capability": {
    "level": "high",
    "reasons": [
      "can send data / act on an external service",
      "can execute shell commands or code"
    ],
    "tags": [
      "code-exec",
      "external-sink"
    ]
  },
  "coverage": {
    "level": "source",
    "inputs": {
      "toolSurface": true,
      "implementationSource": true,
      "packageMetadata": true,
      "liveTransport": false
    },
    "caveats": [
      "Tools were statically extracted from the published source (8 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
    ]
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/cli.js"
      },
      "evidence": "port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import path from 'path'; import fs from 'fs/promises'; const __filename = fileU",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/cli.js",
        "line": 9,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/health-check.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/health-check.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/health-check.js"
      },
      "evidence": "port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import chalk from 'chalk'; import ora from 'ora'; import boxen from 'boxen'; imp",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/health-check.js",
        "line": 6,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/uninstall.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/uninstall.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/uninstall.js"
      },
      "evidence": "port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import chalk from 'chalk'; import ora from 'ora'; import boxen from 'boxen'; imp",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/uninstall.js",
        "line": 6,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
      "title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/cli.js)",
      "category": "exfiltration",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:418`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/cli.js"
      },
      "evidence": "const response = await axios.get('https://registry.npmjs.org/@worksona/delegator-mcp/latest'); const latestVers",
      "owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
        "file": "dist/cli.js",
        "line": 418,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
      "title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/cli.js)",
      "category": "injection",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:242`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/cli.js"
      },
      "evidence": "startup...')); execSync(`node \"${serverPath}\" --test`, { stdio: 'inherit', env: process.env",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
        "file": "dist/cli.js",
        "line": 242,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
      "title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/health-check.js)",
      "category": "injection",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/health-check.js:128`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/health-check.js"
      },
      "evidence": "const output = execSync(`dir \"${directoryPath}\" /-c`, { encoding: 'utf8' }); const match = output.match",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
        "file": "dist/health-check.js",
        "line": 128,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
      "title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/uninstall.js)",
      "category": "injection",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/uninstall.js:389`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/uninstall.js"
      },
      "evidence": "try { execSync(`sudo rm -f \"${symlinkPath}\"`, { stdio: 'ignore' }); } catch (sudoError) {",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
        "file": "dist/uninstall.js",
        "line": 389,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/install.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/install.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/install.js"
      },
      "evidence": "port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import fs from 'fs/promises'; import path from 'path'; import os from 'os'; impo",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/install.js",
        "line": 3,
        "nonRuntime": true
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/setup.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/setup.js:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/setup.js"
      },
      "evidence": "port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import os from 'os'; const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url); const _",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/setup.js",
        "line": 15,
        "nonRuntime": true
      }
    }
  ],
  "toxicFlows": [],
  "capabilities": [
    {
      "tool": "delegate_task",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "list_patterns",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "get_agent_types",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "analyze_task_complexity",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "get_delegation_status",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "Delegation Patterns",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "Agent Types",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "Configuration",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    }
  ],
  "surfaceDigest": "aed9e7649f019fba7592e3e218a2a8a7065c1bdca2dc1cf14c84bd146e7529fd",
  "stats": {
    "tools": 8,
    "prompts": 0,
    "resources": 0,
    "findingsBySeverity": {
      "critical": 0,
      "high": 3,
      "medium": 4,
      "low": 2,
      "info": 0
    }
  }
}